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Abstract 
 
Kenya, like the rest of the world, in an effort to protect its tax base, has enacted a transfer pricing 
(TP) legislation requiring, among other things, that inter-company transactions be conducted at 
arm’s length.  However, due to the very nature of TP transactions, the determination of the 
correct arm’s length price or profit margin has remained a major challenge, not only for the 
taxpayers, but for the tax authority as well.  Given the divergent interests of the parties 
concerning the tax consequences of a transaction, this uncertainty escalates the potential of 
disputes between tax authorities and taxpayers. Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs) provides a 
mechanism through which disputes may be avoided ex ante by parties agreeing in advance on the 
methodology to be applied in determining the arm’s length price or profit margin, thereby 
offering the much needed certainty in transfer pricing issues. However, Kenya, and indeed the 
rest of Africa are yet to embrace APAs despite the existence of evidence of its success from 
other jurisdictions.   
This work explores the possibility of adoption of APAs within Kenya’s tax and legal system to 
help in the resolution of TP disputes, an issue which is currently one of the major international 
tax challenges facing the country.  The study commences by briefly outlining the transfer pricing 
problem and the various TP dispute resolution mechanisms currently available. The study then 
examines the OECD recommendations on APAs and how those recommendations have been 
implemented at the domestic level by a selected OECD and non-OECD members. Based on the 
countries’ experience, the study then critically assesses the possibility of adoption of the 
programme in Kenya by focusing mainly on the legal considerations that the implementation of 
APAs would raise. A conclusion is then reached that while there may be some criticisms against 
the programme, the advantages offered by APAs outweigh such disadvantages. Consequently, a 
recommendation is made for the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) to consider implementing the 
programme, by learning from the experiences of the early implementers such as the United 
States (US), but taking precaution to adapt such experiences to fit Kenya’s unique socio-
economic and legal circumstances.   
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Background and Purpose 
 
 
Section 18(3) of the Act does not tell tax payers what KRA will accept as an arm’s length or how to prove 
it to them or if they are willing to negotiate pricing arrangements. I do hope KRA will lead in this 
initiative to make rules in this regard as India did as early as 2001.
1
 
 
For many corporate taxpayers, a five-year audit, three years at Appeals, and then another five years in 
court and two more on appeal usually proves to be just a bit too much. Quick math = 15 years.
2
 
 
 
 
On 5
th
 October 2005, the High Court of Kenya delivered its judgment in the case of Unilever 
Kenya Ltd v Commissioner of Domestic Taxes.
3
 It is this decision that has been credited with the 
enactment of transfer pricing (TP) rules in Kenya.
4
 Indeed, the rules were in place barely nine 
months after the judgment.
5
 The judgment also acknowledged the relevance in Kenya of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) Model Convention on 
Income and on Capital (‘OECD Model Tax Convention’) and the accompanying rules, more 
specifically, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (‘OECD TP Guidelines’).6 
 
Apart from these two significant contributions by the Unilever judgment to the Kenyan tax 
jurisprudence, the judgment also gave an indication of the need for the enactment of Advance 
Pricing Agreements (APAs) into the Kenyan tax law.
7
 This latter recommendation however has 
not received much attention and as far as the author is aware, no extensive research has been 
done towards this end.
8
 Most of the existing literature has only taken a general look at the subject 
of transfer pricing from the Kenyan perspective. Rispha (2008),
9
 Jasper (2011),
10
 Ann (2011),
11
 
Ratemo (2012),
12
 and Chege (2013),
13
 as part of fulfillment of their respective degree exams 
                                                             
1Unilever Kenya Ltd v Commissioner of Income Tax, [2005]eKLR, p. 15 [Visram J], available at 
<http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/12804/> accessed on 28th March 2015. In this statement, the Judge must have been 
at that time referring to the transfer pricing rules in general. Advance pricing rules were only introduced in India with effect 
from July 2012 vide Finance Act, 2012, with the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) notifying the implementing rules in the 
official gazette of August 31, 2012. 
2
 John. C. Klotsche, ‘United States: Jousting With The Tax Man: An Extreme Makeover, IRS Edition’ (3 Jul. 2009) quoted in 
Michelle Markham, Advance Pricing Agreements; Past Present and Future (Kluwer Law International 2012) p.19   
3 Unilever(n.1) 
4 See for example, Lee Corrick, ‘Transfer Pricing Disputes in Africa’ in Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan (eds), Resolving 
Transfer Pricing Disputes: A Global Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
5 The Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules, 2006; Effective date: July 1, 2006  
6 OECD (2010): Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administration, OECD Publishing 2010 ( 
hereinafter referred to as ‘OECD TP Guidelines’) 
7 Unilever (n 1) p. 15 
8 There have been however newspaper reports to the effect that the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) could be currently 
considering introducing the programme; See,  Titus Nguhiu, ‘Taxman’s new take on transfer pricing will attract foreign 
investments’, The East African (Nairobi, 15 November 2014) <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/-
/434750/2523572/-/dbfo67/-/index.html> accessed on April 4, 2015 
9 Rispah Mwangi, ‘Transfer Pricing: Does Kenya’s Tax Law Provide Adequately for This?’ (LLM thesis, University of Nairobi 2008) 
10
 Jasper Mbiuki, ‘The Legal and Institutional Framework  of Transfer Pricing in Kenya: A Case Study of the Unilever Case and its 
Aftermath’ (LLM thesis, University of Nairobi 2011) 
11 Ann J. W, ‘The Kenya Income Tax Law: Its Inadequacies in the Regulation of Transfer Pricing’ (LLM thesis, University of Nairobi 
2012) 
12 Mosota J. R, ‘Transfer Pricing Regulation in Kenya: A Critique’ (LLM thesis, University of Nairobi 2011) 
 6 
 
wrote on the subject, but none of the studies focused expansively on the dispute resolution 
aspects of TP issues, particularly APAs. Another Kenyan researcher, Bosire Nyamori (2012) has 
also done some work on the subject but he too took a general perspective on the topic and 
concluded that while the introduction of TP Rules in Kenya would serve to ensure some measure 
of certainty, its success would however be impeded by the lack of requisite expertise and 
comparable data.
14
  
 
This thesis is therefore intended to be an effort towards bridging this gap by looking at the 
concept of APAs and assessing the possibility of the programme’s adoption in Kenya. The study, 
among others, looks at the at the OECD recommendations on APAs and how such 
recommendations have been implemented at the domestic level by a selected OECD and non-
OECD countries. The study then proceeds to assess whether the programme, if it were to be 
adopted by Kenya, would be compatible with the Kenya’s tax and legal systems, including the 
country’s constitutional provisions and the prevailing judicial practice.  
 
Methods and Materials 
 
The methodology adopted for this work is largely qualitative research, consisting of a critical and 
comparative legal analytic review of the relevant legislation, case law, and literature. To some 
extent, a quantitative approach is also adopted, particularly in relation to Chapter 3 of the study 
regarding the analysis of the statistical APA reports as published by the countries under study, to 
wit, China, India and the Unites States (US) on the performance of their respective APA 
programmes.  
Delimitation and Scope 
First, this study will be limited to the concept of APAs as a mechanism for resolving TP disputes 
prospectively. Although references are made to the other TP dispute resolution mechanisms such 
as litigation, mutual agreement procedure (MAP) and arbitration, such a references are only 
limited to the drawing of parallels and to aid in the better understanding of APAs as a concept.  
Second, the study will not deal extensively with the non-legal aspects of APAs such as the 
programme’s costs implications, the need for staff with the requisite transfer pricing knowledge 
and the other administrative features of the programme.   
Secondly, the study will pay particular attention to the OECD recommendations on APAs and 
how those recommendations have implemented in practice by a selected OECD and non-OECD 
member countries. While it is acknowledged that apart from the OECD, other bodies such as the 
United Nations
15
 and the European Union
16
 have also done some work in the area of APAs, such 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 Patrick N. Chege, ‘The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Transfer Pricing Guidelines: An 
Evaluation of their Effectiveness in the Kenya’s Tax Regime’ (LLM thesis, University of Nairobi 2013) 
14 Bosire Nyamori, ‘An Analysis of Kenya’s Transfer Pricing Regime’, International Transfer Pricing Journal, (2012), March/April, 
pp. 153-60 
15
 Through the works of the UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters which has developed a 
number of documents on transfer pricing. See for example; UN, Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, 
2013, Chapter 9 
16 Through the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum; See for example, COM (2007) 71 final, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the European Economic and Social Committee on the Work of the EU 
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works will not be considered extensively (although reference may be occasionally made thereto) 
due to the fact they heavily borrow from the OECD recommendations,
17
 which itself also 
borrowed from the works of the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) on APAs.
18
 
For the purposes of this study, the works of the OECD have been chosen over the latter because 
of the organisation’s wide membership.19 Finally, although there are a number of OECD member 
countries currently running the APA programme, the US has been chosen due to the county’s 
longest history and extensive experience on APAs.
20
 Due to the fact that APAs are yet to be 
embraced by the African countries,
21
 experiences from China and India, which are some of the 
leading Kenya’s trading partners,22 are integrated into the study to get the developing countries’ 
perspective.  
Finally, due to language limitations, materials used in the research will be limited only to those in 
English. It is however acknowledged that there could be lots of valuable literature on the subject 
in other languages, especially regarding the Chinese APA which forms the part of this study. 
Outline 
 
This work is divided into five chapters as follows: Chapter 1 briefly describes the TP problem 
and also outlines the various TP dispute resolution mechanisms that may be available to a 
taxpayer for this purpose. Chapter 2 then looks at the Kenyan TP legislative framework with 
particular focus on the dispute resolution aspects of the TP issues. A brief assessment of the 
various TP dispute resolution mechanisms currently available under the Kenyan law is also done. 
Chapter 3 commences by setting out the OECD recommendations on APAs and then proceeds to 
assess how those recommendations have been implemented at the domestic level by the US, one 
of the OECD member countries with the longest (currently more than 20 years) experience of the 
programme. To get the developing countries’ perspective, the study also integrates the 
experiences from China and India. Chapter 4 then examines the possible legal considerations that 
may underlie the implementation and application of an APA programme. The identified issues 
are then be mirrored against the Kenyan legislative and constitutional framework with a view of 
assessing the programme’s compatibility with the Kenyan legal system. Chapter 5 concludes. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
joint transfer pricing forum in the field of dispute avoidance and resolution procedures and on guidelines for advance pricing 
arrangements within the EU, February 26, 2007, Annex.  
17 ibid n. 15 and n. 16 
18 PATA, ‘BAPA Operational Guidance for Member Countries of the Pacific Association of Tax Administrators’, February 6, 2004; 
PATA was reconstituted to Leeds Castle Group in 2006 bringing in as new members, China, Germany, India, France, South Korea 
and UK in addition to the four countries (Australia, Canada, Japan and the US) originally forming PATA;  See,  Toshio Miyatake, 
‘Transfer Disputes in Japan’ in Edward Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan (eds), Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes: A Global Analysis 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) 
19 Currently, the OECD has 34 Member Countries compared to EU’s 28. (see note 18 above and the OECD website available at, < 
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm> accessed on May 12, 2015 
20 Michelle Markham, Advance Pricing Agreements: Past Present and Future (Kluwer Law International 2012), Preface 
21
 See, Lee Corrick, (n 4)) 
22 KNBS, Statistical Abstract 2014, Available at, 
<http://www.knbs.or.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=106&Itemid=1177> accessed on May 12, 
2015)  
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CHAPTER 1 
1 THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In an increasingly globalised business environment, transfer pricing has become one of the major 
international tax challenges currently facing most countries. Consequently, a number of 
supranational organisations, key among them the OECD, have dedicated substantial effort 
towards strategies to help in dealing with these challenges.
23
 The issue has become the center of 
focus in the ongoing OECD/G20 BEPS Project where, apart from being listed as one of the six 
‘key pressure areas’,24 the topic has been exclusively assigned three out of the 15 Action Points 
of the BEPS Project.
25
 The remaining 12 Action Points though not listed as TP ‘key’ areas, 
relates in a significant way to the subject.
26
 For example, Actions 13 and 14 which deals Transfer 
Pricing Documentation and Dispute Resolution respectively, have as their core major TP 
issues.
27
 The increased focus on TP issues has been attributed to among other things, the 
realisation of the fact that inter-company transactions constitutes approximately 60 percent of the 
world trade.
28
  
 
With this kind of international focus on TP issues, it is by no surprise that a 2013 global transfer 
pricing survey of 878 MNEs across 26 countries revealed that globally, tax authorities have 
stepped up their enforcement measures, with particular attention being given to transfer pricing 
matters. Consequently, a majority (66 percent) of the respondents MNEs identified transfer 
pricing risk management as their highest priority, an increase of 32 percent from the 2007 
survey.
29
 With most countries experiencing shortfall in their revenues, tax administrations 
globally have focused more on transfer pricing enforcement to bridge this gap.
30
   
 
In Kenya, since the landmark decision in the Unilever case, transfer pricing has equally been an 
area of significant focus by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) which has put more emphasis 
on the legislative, administrative and capacity building initiatives to address the issue.
31
 The 
latest legislative action by the Kenyan Government in the area of international tax, a transfer 
pricing related area, is the 2014 amendment to the Income Tax Act (ITA) by broadening of the 
                                                             
23 See for example, OECD (2012), Dealing Effectively with the Challenges of Transfer Pricing, OECD Publishing. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264169463-en > accessed on April 8, 2015 
24 See, the OECD (2013), Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, available at 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en> accessed on April 8, 2015; The other five ‘key’ areas of focus by the BEPS 
project are, Aggressive Tax Planning, Tax Treaties, Tax Policy and Statistics, Tax & Development and Tax Compliance 
25 Action Points 8, 9 and 10, ‘Ensuring that Transfer Pricing outcomes are in line with value creation’ (see,  OECD (2013), Action 
Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, ,  OECD Publishing, available at, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en > 
accessed on April 8, 2015 
26 See,   OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (n. 25) 
27 OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (n. 25) 
28 OECD: OECD Insights, 18 April 2013 Debate the Issues < http://oecdinsights.org/2012/03/26/pricefixing/> accessed on April 8, 
2015 
29 Ernst & Young 2013 Global Transfer Pricing Survey; Navigating the Choppy Waters of International Tax, available at 
<http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/2013-Global-Transfer-Pricing-Survey > accessed  April 8, 2015 
30 See, Michelle Markham, (n.20) p. 6 
31 European Commission (2011): Transfer Pricing and Developing Countries, p 24, 26 and 52, available at 
<https://www.google.co.ke/?gws_rd=ssl#q=European+Commission+%282011%29:+Transfer+Pricing+and+Developing+Countrie
s>  accessed on April 8, 2015 
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definition of a Permanent Establishment (PE) to include among others, the activities of a 
dependent agent. Further, in a move apparently intended to address the problem of risk-stripping 
which may occur as a result of restructurings, taxpayers are with effect from January 1, 2015 
required to notify the KRA of any changes in their corporate and business structures.
32
  
 
At approximately 22 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, taxation remains the single 
largest source of revenue for the Kenyan Government.
33
 Statistics indicate that approximately 75 
percent of the country’s tax revenue comes from the large taxpayers of which multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) forms a substantial part.
34
 Consequently, in recognition of this central role 
played by MNEs in the country’s tax system, the KRA created a specialist transfer pricing unit 
within the Large Taxpayers Office (LTO) which is currently aggressively pursuing TP audits.
35
 
As of 11
th
 July 2014, it was reported that the unit had carried out TP audits on approximately50 
MNEs, resulting into a total tax yield of over Sh25 billion (approximately USD 272 million).
36
 
Some of these assessments have been contested with only a few finding their way to the 
administrative tribunals and ultimately to the courts. A majority of the contested cases have 
however been settled at the KRA level.
37
 It is against this backdrop, and in recognition of APAs 
ability to avoid disputes ex-ante, on a principled basis, that the need for a possible adoption of 
the APA programme in the Kenyan tax system will be evaluated.   
1.2 Description of the TP Problem 
 
Transfer pricing has been defined as ‘[t]he area of tax law that is dedicated to the tax 
consequences of the pricing of cross-border intercompany transactions’.38 International transfer 
pricing issues arise when entities of a multinational enterprise (MNE) resident for tax purposes in 
different tax jurisdictions transact with each other. Unlike independent enterprises whose 
dealings are generally determined by market forces, associated enterprises (whether legally or 
economically),
39
 are in principle free to set transfer prices for their intra-firm transactions. The 
prices so set may deviate from what they would have been in an open market scenario with the 
result that the profitability of the individual entities of the MNE may be affected in one way or 
the other. This will in turn have an effect on the taxes payable in the various jurisdict ions where 
the individual entities are tax resident. MNEs normally use this ‘internal market pricing 
mechanism’ to reduce their overall tax burden by shifting profits from high tax jurisdictions to 
relatively low tax jurisdictions. This could be achieved, for example, by overstating the price of 
goods sold by a subsidiary established in a low tax jurisdiction to a subsidiary established in a 
high tax jurisdiction. This way, the subsidiary in the high tax jurisdiction would declare higher 
costs and therefore lower profits than the comparable market conditions. The excess profit would 
however be registered by the MNE in the jurisdiction with a lower tax rate, hence minimising the 
MNE’s overall tax burden.40  
                                                             
32 See Finance Act 2015, Section [2], [15] 
33 See for example, EU Commission (2011): (n.31), Appendix D: Country Study-Kenya, p. 9 
34KRA: Large Taxpayers Office, available at <http://www.revenue.go.ke/index.php/domestic-taxes/large-taxpayers-
office/about-lto/vision > accessed on 8th April 2015  
35 ibid; see also, EU Commission (2011): (n.31), Appendix D: Country Study-Kenya, p. 18 
36 John Njiraini, ‘Remarks at the AIBUMA Conference’ (Nairobi, 11 July 2014), available at, 
http://www.revenue.go.ke/index.php/notices/kra-news/1034-kra-cg-mr-njiraini-speech-aibuma-conference-11-july-2014 
(accessed on 8th April 2015) 
37 See for example, Patrick Chege, (n.13), p.119; Patrick Chege is currently the head on TP unit in KRA 
38 Jérôme Monsenego, Introduction to Transfer Pricing (Studentlitterarur AB 2013) p. 13 
39 See, the OECD TP Guidelines, para 1.2 
40 For further illustration Jérôme Monsenego (n.38), p.18-20 
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In order to protect their respective tax bases against such TP manipulation, countries around the 
globe have enacted TP legislations. These legislations are generally predicated upon the arm’s 
length principle (ALP),
41
 a standard which endeavours to replicate the ‘working of the open 
market in cases where goods and services are transferred between associated enterprises.’42 This 
principle which was first developed and applied in the USA before being adopted by the 
OECD,
43
 requires  MNEs to set  prices for their internal transactions (transfer price) in such a 
way as reflect the price that would have been charged for similar transaction(s)  entered into by 
independent parties in similar circumstances (arm’s length price).44 Therefore if a particular 
intra-firm transaction happens to be inconsistent with a comparable independent transaction, 
such legislation generally authorises tax authorities to adjust, for tax purposes,
45
 the relevant 
transfer price in order to achieve consistency with the comparable transaction. It is this 
adjustment by the tax authorities that has always been the source of transfer disputes globally.
46
  
 
Transfer pricing disputes are further escalated by the fact that the TP legislations, acceptable 
methodologies and interpretation of the ALP and how it is to be applied in practice are still not 
uniform internationally, with variations from country to country.
47
 This has led to disputes not 
only between the tax authorities and the MNEs, but also between the tax authorities inter se. A 
case in point is the GlaxoSmithKline (‘GSK’) case,48 where, on the one hand, the US took the 
position that pharmaceutical products marketed in the US by the United Kingdom (‘UK’) parent 
through their US associate derived their primary value from the marketing activities in the US; 
the UK (and GSK) on the other hand, took the position that it is the Research and Development 
(‘R&D’) owned by the UK parent that gave the pharmaceutical products their primary value. 
Despite the fact that the case was eventually settled with GSK paying to the United States USD 
3.4 billion, which was then described as ‘the largest single payment to IRS [...] in the resolution 
of a tax dispute’,49 the 16 year dispute not only resulted into the company being double taxed 
(since no corresponding adjustment was made by the UK), but also demonstrated the deficiencies 
of the mutual agreement process as a dispute settlement mechanism under the income tax 
treaties.
50
   
1.3 Dealing with the Transfer Pricing Disputes  
 
International juridical double taxation is considered a hindrance to international trade,
51
 and 
therefore in recognition of the need to avoid it, countries have entered into double tax treaties 
                                                             
41 See for example S. 18(3) of the Kenyan ITA and the rules made thereunder. 
42 OECD TP Guidelines, paras 1.1-1.5 
43 See Mark Bronson et al, ‘Overview/Best Practices’ in Duff & Phelps (eds), Guide to International Transfer Pricing: Law, Tax 
Planning and Compliance Strategies (Kluwer Law International 2013) 
44 ibid (n 31) 
45 The adjustments are only for tax purposes, without affecting other (non-tax) rights and obligations that may underlie a 
transaction, see, OECD TP Guidelines, para 1.2 
46 See for example, Ian Roxan, ‘Introduction’ in Edward Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan (eds), Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes: A 
Global Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
47 Brazil, China and India are examples some of the countries that do not strictly follow the OECD TP Guidelines; see for 
example, Patrick Chege (n. 13), pp. [3-4], [46-64] 
48 IR-2006-142, 11 Sept. 2006 
49
 ibid; see also, Michelle Markham (n. 20), p10 
50 ibid 
51 Juridical double taxation is defined by the OECD Model Tax Convention as ‘imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) 
States on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods’ (See, Introduction to the 2010 
OECD Model Tax Convention, para 1) 
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modeled alongside the OECD Model Tax Convention which generally recommends that where 
an upward TP adjustment (primary adjustment) by one country results into a MNE being double 
taxed, the double taxation may be relieved by either the tax administration of the other 
contracting party making a corresponding adjustment, or where that is not possible, the tax 
administration that made the primary adjustment may as well reverse the adjustment.
52
 The 
treaties also provide for a mechanism for the resolution of any disputes that may arise in the 
process. This is however generally without prejudice to a taxpayer’s right of access to the 
national courts.
53
 
 
Currently, there exist four main dispute settlement and avoidance mechanisms which have been 
recognised by the OECD for resolving transfer pricing disputes. These mechanisms include, first, 
litigating before the national courts,
54
 second, Mutual Agreement Procedure (‘MAP’),55 third, 
Arbitration,
56
 and finally Advance Pricing Agreements (APA). A global survey
57
 on these 
mechanisms has however revealed the APA process as the most preferred of the four in ensuring 
certainty and predictability on transfer pricing issues, with 79% of the respondents recording 
their satisfaction with the process.
58
 Safe harbour rules are strongly discouraged by the OECD 
TP Guidelines and will not therefore be considered in this study.
59
  
1.3.1 Transfer Pricing Litigation 
 
Litigation though sometimes preferred by MNEs due to its ability to deliver some sort of 
immediate temporary injunctive relief,
60
 is generally the least preferred mechanism in resolving 
transfer pricing disputes. According the Ernst & Young 2013 global survey,
61
 only 15% of the 
respondents had referred their cases to litigation as opposed to 28% and 26% for MAP and APAs 
respectively. The primary source of dissatisfaction with litigation was found by the survey to be 
the length of the process.
62
 A study conducted by the European Union (EU) on company taxation 
also concluded that the delay in the litigation of transfer pricing disputes is primarily due to the 
fact that transfer pricing is not a juridical discipline as it focuses more on economics.
63
 There is 
therefore the possibility that some judges may not be possessed of the requisite specialist 
knowledge and experience in transfer pricing matters. A case in point is the decision in the 
Unilever case where the court took the view that for a transfer pricing adjustment by a tax 
authority on a MNEs transactions to be upheld, it is necessary for the tax administration to prove 
‘fraud or ill will’ on the part of a taxpayer. The court stated that:     
 
The respondent has submitted that this arrangement has been made deliberately to show 
lesser earnings. But is that really so? There is no evidence of tax fraud or tax cheating. The 
                                                             
52 See Article 9(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
53 See Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
54 In the European Union, there is an option of having tax matters ventilated up to, for example the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (see for example Art. 263 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). 
55 OECD Model Tax Convention, Article 25(3) 
56 OECD Model Tax Convention, Article 25 (5) 
57 Ernst & Young 2013 Global Transfer Pricing Survey (n. 29) 
58 ibid p.25 
59 See OECD TP Regulations para 4.96 
60 See, EU Commission (2011): (n.31), Appendix D: Country Study-Kenya, p. 16  
61
 Ernst & Young 2013 Global Transfer Pricing Survey (n. 29) p.27 
62 ibid 
63 European Commission (2001): Commission Staff Working Paper: Company Taxation in the Internal Market, p275, available at 
<https://www.google.se/?gfe_rd=cr&ei=bNkrVaTHHcvw-gaSpIGoBw&gws_rd=ssl#q=company-tax-study-EU+2001.pdf> 
accessed on 8th April 2015 
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only evidence, material, is in regard to methods used for computation of tax. Use of 
different methods, so long as proper or lawful or rather not unlawful, is permissible and 
ought to be permissible so long as there is no fraudulent trading with a view to “evading” 
tax.
64
 (Italics supplied) 
 
This position is clearly contrary to the principles that underlie a transfer pricing adjustment. 
According to the OECD, for a transfer pricing adjustment to be made, the primary consideration 
should always be whether a transaction meets the arm’s length standard. The existence of a 
motive or intention on the part of a taxpayer to evade or avoid taxes is therefore immaterial.
65
 
The United Nations Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (UN TP 
Manual) also echoes the OECD position.
66
 
 
Further, litigation in most cases only addresses a transfer pricing problem from the perspective of 
one of the jurisdictions and therefore takes a one-sided approach and does not look into the other 
side of the border and consequently may not guarantee elimination of double taxation.
67
 Transfer 
pricing, by its very definition affects taxable revenue in more than one jurisdiction, any dispute 
resolution mechanism that does not take a holistic view in addressing a transfer pricing problem 
therefore runs the risk of being ineffective. 
 
Additionally, where a national court has failed to relieve any double taxation that may have 
arisen, the possibility of getting the same relived in a subsequent MAP will be significantly 
reduced since in some jurisdictions, tax authorities may be bound by the decision of the court 
and may not therefore have any legal authority to pursue MAP subsequent to the court’s 
decision.
68
 Other disadvantages of litigation include the fact that it can be a very costly and time 
consuming process in view of the fact that transfer pricing disputes are usually fact intensive and 
involve substantial amounts of background material.
69
 There is also the question of independence 
of the national courts and the possibility that courts may be influenced by what Markham (2012) 
calls ‘economic nationalism’, that is, the courts being predisposed towards securing what they 
may perceive as their country’s  fair share of the global revenue.70 
 
In view of the above reasons, it is by no surprise that the EY global survey revealed that not 
many MNEs venture into transfer pricing litigation and even the few that do, are generally not 
satisfied with the process.
71
 This finding was confirmed by the EU study,
72
 which also concluded 
that the general and satisfactory transfer pricing dispute settlement mechanism within the EU is 
unlikely to be litigation.  
1.3.2 Article 25 Procedures (MAP, Arbitration and APA) 
 
The other TP dispute resolution mechanisms are the mutual agreement procedure (MAP) and 
arbitration, outlined under Article 25(3) and 25(5) respectively of the OECD Model Tax 
                                                             
64 Unilever, (n 1) p. 13 
65 OECD TP Guidelines para 1.2 
66 UN, Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for developing Countries (‘UN TP Manual’), 2013, para. 3 
67 European Commission (2001): Commission Staff Working Paper (n.63) 
68 See UN, Guide to the Mutual Agreement Procedure Under Tax Treaties, 2012, para 79; See also, OECD Model Tax Convention, 
Commentary on Article 25, para 24 
69 See for example, European Commission (2001): Commission Staff Working Paper (n.63) 
70 Michelle Markam (n.20), p. 9-10 
71 Ernst & Young 2013 Global Transfer Pricing Survey (n. 29) 
72 European Commission (2001): Commission Staff Working Paper (n.63) 
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Convention. Article 25(3), apart from authorising MAP also recognises APAs.
73
 While the MAP 
process has been fairly helpful in the resolution of TP disputes, it has been found wanting in 
some aspects. Article 25 allows a taxpayer to lodge a complaint with the country in which he is a 
resident whenever such a taxpayer is of the view that through the actions of one or both 
countries, he has suffered, or he is likely to suffer double taxation. Once such a complaint is 
filed, the ‘competent authority’74 in which the taxpayer is tax resident has the option of either 
granting a unilateral relief or where that is not possible, to have the same resolved through a 
MAP with the competent authority of the other contracting state.
75
 
 
The MAP process is conducted on the basis of panctum de negotiando and there is therefore no 
obligation on the parties to reach an agreement. The Article provides that the competent 
authorities are only to ‘endeavour’ to resolve the case by mutual agreement.76 This lack of 
obligation on the part of the competent authorities to reach agreement has the potential of leaving 
double taxation unrelieved as was the case in GlaxoSmithKline case where the US and the UK 
competent authorities failed to reach a settlement. 
 
Another limitation of the MAP process is that not all bilateral treaties have a provision for 
granting a corresponding relief in case of double taxation as recommended by Article 9(2) of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. One such treaty is the Kenya – Sweden income tax treaty.77 
While it has been suggested that the mere absence of such a provision in a treaty may not be 
ground enough for a contracting state to deny a corresponding relief under a MAP procedure 
since such a position would be seen to be contrary to the very essence of entering an income tax 
agreement and would therefore amount to a breach of the obligations under the treaty,
78
 it is 
equally asserted,
79
 that in the absence of rules similar to those of Art. 9(2) OECD Model Tax 
Convention, economic double taxation resulting from a TP adjustment is not to form part of 
MAP. This uncertainty undermines the effective resolution of transfer pricing disputes.  
 
 Prior to the 2008 update of the OECD Model Tax Convention which introduced arbitration 
within the MAP process,
80
 there existed no mechanism within the OECD framework to compel 
competent authorities to reach an agreement in respect of disputes under income tax treaties 
double taxation complaint filed with them.
81
 However, despite this modification, only a few 
countries have so far included this provision in their treaties.
82
 Possible reasons for this 
reluctance have been said to be related to among others, sovereignty concerns which includes 
trepidations as to ‘whether it is constitutionally possible to bind one’s country by an arbitrated 
outcome and whether it would be possible to attain sufficient political support for adding such an 
                                                             
73 See OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentaries to Art. 25, para 50 
74 The term ‘competent authority’ generally refers to a person or persons designated by a State for purposes of representing its 
consent with regard to a treaty; see, OECD Model Tax Convention, Commentary on Art. 3, para 7; See also, Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2(1) (c).  
75 OECD Model Tax Convention, Art. 25 (2) 
76 ibid, Art. 25(3) 
77 See for example,  Article VI of the Kenya-Sweden Treaty  on Income and Capital, entered in force on 28th December 1973; See 
also Germany-Kenya Income and Capital Treaty 
78 See paragraph 10 of the Commentary on Article 25 OECD Model Tax Convention  
79 For example, by countries such as Brazil and India; See, OECD Model Tax Convention, Non-OECD Economies’ Positions on the 
OECD Model Tax Convention, Positions on Art. 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) and Its Commentary, para 5 
80 See Article 25(5) OECD Model Tax Convention 
81 The EU began this trend in the 1990 before OECD adopted it in 2008; see also US-Canada income tax treaty which has a 
mandatory binding Arbitration 
82 Michelle Markham (n 20) p 22-3  
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obligation under the treaty.’83 For these reasons, even the OECD itself has acknowledged that a 
move towards a universal mandatory arbitration is currently not foreseeable.
84
 
 
Due to the various limitations associated with the competent authority process (including 
arbitration), like litigation, a 2010 survey by the EY revealed less reliance by MNEs on this 
process as a mechanism for resolving transfer pricing disputes.
85
 It has been speculated that the 
decline in the use of the other dispute resolution mechanisms could be attributable to the 
increased availability of APAs and a general desire by taxpayers to manage tax controversy 
prospectively.
86
 As had been noted earlier, the 2013 EY survey, compared to the 2010 and 2007 
surveys revealed an improvement in the use of APAs with 26 percent of the respondents 
reporting the use of APAs in 2012 up from 21 percent in 2007.
87
 The level of satisfaction with 
APA as a process of preventing transfer pricing disputes was equally found to be very high, with 
79 percent of the parent companies surveyed recording their satisfaction.
88
 From these statistics, 
it may be safe to conclude that it is APAs’ ability to proactively resolve transfer pricing issues ex 
ante, and the certainty that it offers, that has perhaps made the programme to become a tool of 
choice not only for MNEs, but for tax administrations as well. 
  
                                                             
83 UN TP Manual, para 9.6.3.7 
84 See, the OECD in the BEPS report (Public Discussion Draft, BEPS Action 14: Make Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More 
Effective, 2014) p. 1 
85 The Ernst & Young 2010 Global Transfer Pricing Survey Addressing the Challenges of Globalization, December 2010,p 3. 
86 ibid, P. 12 
87 Ernst & Young 2013 Global Transfer Pricing Survey (n. 29), p 25. 
88 ibid 
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CHAPTER 2 
2 KENYA’S TRANSFER PRICING DISPUTE RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
 
For the purposes of protecting its tax base, Kenya, like the rest of the world has enacted a 
transfer pricing legislation, which legislation also provides for the various mechanisms through 
which disputes arising from a TP adjustment under the legislation may be resolved. Given the 
international nature of TP issues, the various income tax treaties to which Kenya is a party 
equally provides for mechanisms for resolving such disputes. This chapter commences by first 
outlining the legal basis of TP in Kenya and then proceeds to look at the various TP dispute 
resolution mechanisms available in Kenya and the experience so far. An assessment of these 
mechanisms is also undertaken. 
2.2 Transfer Pricing: The Legal Authority 
 
The statutory power to undertake a TP adjustment in a related party transaction is vested on the 
tax authority vide Section 18(3) of the ITA. For the purposes of the provision, and with the 
specific reference to companies, parties are related where one either (a) participates directly or 
indirectly in the management, control or capital of the business of the other, or (b) a third person 
participates directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of the business of both of 
them. 
 
This provision which is broadly based on the OECD TP Guidelines also permits under Section 
18(8) of the ITA for the issuance of guidelines for the better operation of Section 18(3). It is 
under this section that the Minister,
89
 in response to the Unilever decision issued the Income Tax 
(Transfer Pricing) Rules, 2006 (‘TP Rules) which became effective on 1st July 2006. The rules in 
their current form provides for among others, the types of transactions covered,
90
 methods of 
determining ALP,
91
 documentation and the general obligations of a taxpayer including the power 
of the Commissioner to call for documents.
92
 There is no specific requirement for 
contemporaneous documentation neither is there a specific penalty for non-compliance with the 
TP Rules. Under rules 10 and 12, the general provisions of the ITA relating to fraud, failure to 
furnish returns, penalties and interest for late payment of tax are made applicable to TP issues as 
well. 
2.3 The Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
There are no special dispute resolution mechanisms under the ITA for transfer pricing cases. TP 
disputes are to be handled the same way as any other dispute arising from the application of the 
other provisions of the ITA. Depending on their nature, disputes arising under the ITA are first to 
be filed either with the ‘Local Committee’ (LC) or the ‘Tribunal’, (which are quasi-judicial 
bodies), with the right of appeal to the High Court and finally to the Court of Appeal.
93
 
                                                             
89 Following the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the designation has since changed to the Cabinet Secretary. 
The two terms will however be used interchangeably in this study. 
90 Income (Tax Transfer Pricing) Rules, Rule 6 
91 Income (Tax Transfer Pricing) Rules, Rule 7 
92 Income (Tax Transfer Pricing) Rules, Rules 8-10 
93 See, ITA, Section 87 and 91A respectively 
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Following the promulgation of a new constitution in Kenya, there currently exist a Supreme 
Court but access to the court from the Court of Appeal is generally restricted to constitutional 
issues.
94
 
2.3.1 The Local Committee/Tribunal 
 
Until 12
th
 April 2015, under section 86(1) of the ITA, the Tribunal was to hear appeals 
concerning (general) anti-avoidance provisions,
95
 while the Local Committee was to hear all the 
other disputes arising under the ITA, including transfer pricing disputes. However, with effect 
from 13
th
 April 2015, the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act (TATA),
96
 which establishes a single Tax 
Appeals Tribunal (TAT) to hear all tax matters, whether direct or indirect taxes, became 
operational.
97
 For the purposes of this research however, more reliance will be made on the pre-
2015 establishment since most of the disputes covered in the study were handled under the prior 
arrangement and at the LC in particular. To the extent that it may be relevant, reference will also 
be made to the TATA, especially where its provisions departs from the earlier position.    
 
Despite the ITA providing for a hierarchy of appeal bodies in tax matters, in practice, many 
taxpayers however still prefer to file their disputes directly to the courts, apparently due to the 
fact that the Kenyan Constitution confers on the High Court the ‘unlimited original jurisdiction 
in all civil and criminal matters’.98 Given the supremacy of the Constitution,99 the courts have 
generally directly admitted tax disputes, with a majority of these cases seeking the court’s 
prerogative orders under its judicial review powers. In Keroche Industries v Kenya Revenue 
Authority & 5 Others,
100
 the KRA had raised an objection to the taxpayer’s direct access to the 
High Court but the court disagreed stating that:   
The respondents’ argument that the applicant came to court prematurely without exhausting 
the internal tax objection process as regards each category of tax, is a serious misdirection 
[…] the issues raised were greater than any of the internal tribunals could handle. The task 
before the court is not, and has not been that of counting the shillings, it has been one of 
adjudicating on illegality, the doctrine of ultra vires, irrationality, procedural impropriety, 
Wednesbury unreasonabless (sic), oppression, malice, bias, discrimination and abuse of 
power.
101
  
Further, according to a study commissioned by the EU, in Kenya, direct access to courts is 
generally preferred by taxpayers due to higher chances of obtaining from the courts, an 
immediate temporary injunctive relief ‘where the KRA is about to freeze taxpayers assets, 
including back accounts.’102 It is perhaps due to the recognition of the supremacy of the 
Constitution that the TATA as well does not contain any provision compelling taxpayers to first 
file their disputes at the TAT before proceeding to the High Court. 
                                                             
94 See, Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Art. 163(4) 
95 The disputes are those arising under Sections 23 and 24 of the ITA. Section 23 is the country’s general anti-avoidance rule 
(GAAR) while section 24 deals with avoidance of tax arising from non-distribution of dividends.  
96 Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, 2013 
97 Legal Notice No. 32 of 20th March 2015 
98 See, Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Art. 165  
99
 See, Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Art. 2 
100 Keroche Industries Limited v Kenya Revenue Authority & 5 Others [2007] eKLR, available at 
<http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/39144 > accessed on April 12, 2015 
101 ibid, p. 34 
102 EU Commission (2011): (n.31), Appendix D: Country Study-Kenya, p.16,  
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However, the situation has been quite different when one looks at the TP disputes so far filed 
against the KRA. As of January 2015, in all the TP disputes that had been filed against KRA, an 
appeal had first been filed in each case with the LC before proceeding to the High Court. A 
possible explanation for this could be that these disputes involved MNEs who may be generally 
keen to comply with the legal provisions of the countries in which they operate and could be 
more concerned about obtaining a substantive resolution of the disputes as opposed to some 
temporary injunctive reliefs, which may only serve to increase the uncertainties involved. 
Because they are generally deemed to be specialised, tribunals are normally expected to fast, 
efficient and expertly deal with the disputes for which they were created. However this is not 
always the case. The LC for example has been found to be suffering from a number of 
shortcomings which ranges from the lack of requisite tax and transfer pricing expertise,
103
 to 
failure by the LC to issue a reasoned opinion of their findings. In the Unilever case for instance, 
Visram J. expressed his frustration for lack of a reasoned decision from the Local Committee 
when he stated that, [u]nfortunately I do not have the benefit of the reasoning of the Local 
Committee and I am bound therefore to consider this appeal in terms of arguments 
advanced before me….”104  
It is perhaps due to these kinds of frustrations that led to an amendment of the ITA in 2012 to 
provide for academic qualifications for appointment to the Local Committee. The amendment 
however still fell short of expressly requiring the Local Committee to issue a reasoned 
decision.
105
 The TATA now expands the 2012 amendments and adds that the Chairman to the 
Tribunal must hold qualifications equivalent to that of a High Court Judge.
106
 It also requires that 
the Tribunal issues a reasoned decision.
107
 The power of the Tribunal to engage an expert witness 
under Section 23 of TATA is likely to be one of its greatest successes. It is expected that this will 
help to enhance the Tribunal’s capacity to make a finding which is well informed.  
2.3.2 The Courts 
All appeals from the decisions of the Local Committee lies with the High Court. However, as 
with the LC, the Court also lacks specialist knowledge in tax matters generally, and Transfer 
pricing issues specifically.
108
 Related to this also is the fact that currently there exists no special 
tax bench within the Kenyan courts system that is exclusively dedicated to tax matters. The 
courts themselves have noted the need for such a bench and have remarked that: 
The court avails itself of this opportunity to call for the establishment of a specialised Tax 
Division of the High Court which may give expeditious hearing of tax disputes in the 
interests, on the one hand, of a quick determination of the tax liability for the tax payers’ 
                                                             
103 EU Commission (2011): (n.31), Appendix D: Country Study-Kenya, p. 15 
104 Unilever,(n 1) p. 12 
105
 Finance Act, No. 57 of 2012, Section 20; the qualifications include, A degree in taxation, finance or law, with five years’ 
experience in the relevant filed. 
106 Section 4, Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, 2013 
107 See, Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, 2013, section 29(4) 
108 See for example, EU Commission (2011): (n.31), Appendix D: Country Study-Kenya, p. 15 
 18 
 
benefit and, on the other hand, in the interests of the Public at large who eventually benefit 
for the proceeds of taxation.
109
 
The situation is made worse by the general huge case backlog currently plaguing the Kenyan 
courts system.
110
 As of October 2013, the KRA reported that as a result of this backlog, 
approximately Sh34.5 billion (USD 370,813,245) in taxes were being held up in the courts, with 
some cases dating as far back as 10 years.
111
 
The adversarial nature of Kenya’s dispute resolution system is another challenge. Generally, the 
parties’ main focus is to win their case, even on procedural technicalities, at the expense of 
having the dispute resolved in a principled and substantive manner.
112
 This may have the effect 
of leaving any underlying double taxation unrelieved. 
2.3.3 Litigation – The Experience so Far 
2.3.3.1 The Unilever Case 
Unilever Kenya Limited (UKL) and Unilever Uganda Limited (UGL), resident for tax purposes 
in Kenya and Uganda respectively are two subsidiaries of Unilever Plc, a company resident in 
the United Kingdom. UKL and UGL are therefore related parties within the meaning Section 
18(6) (b) of the Kenyan ITA since a third person, Unilever Plc, ‘participates directly or indirectly 
in the management, control or capital of the business of both’.  
By a contract dated 28
th
 August 1995, UKL, a manufacturer, agreed to produce various 
household goods on behalf of UGL, a distributor, for their Uganda market. An audit by the KRA 
on UKL for the 1995 and 1996 tax periods revealed (according to KRA) that the prices that were 
charged by UKL for the goods produced under the contract were not at arm’s length. That UKL 
had sold the goods to UGL at prices which were much lower than their comparable sales, both in 
the domestic market (Kenya) and in its exports to unrelated parties. An adjustment under Section 
18(3) of the ITA was consequently made by the KRA. 
The adjustment was contested by UKL which first proceeded under Section 86 (1) (b) of the ITA 
and filed an appeal with the LC. On 17
th
 September 2003, the LC decided the matter in favour of 
the KRA. UKL consequently appealed against this decision to the High Court on points of law 
and argued, among others, that Section 18(3) of the ITA as it then stood was ambiguous to the 
extent that it did not provide guidance on how to determine an arm’s length price. Further, it was 
UKL’s argument that in the absence such guidance, it was open for a taxpayer to resort, as they 
did, to the international best practices, in this case, the OECD TP Guidelines for guidance. The 
KRA on the other hand contended, among others, that Section 18(3) of the ITA as it then stood 
was clear on the subject and therefore the question of looking elsewhere for guidance could not 
even arise in the first place. Additionally, the KRA argued that the OECD TP Guidelines, on 
                                                             
109 Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority Ex-ParteAbdalla Brek Said T/A Al Amry Distributors & 4 others [2015] eKLR, p. 3, 
available at < http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/105263/> (accessed on 12th April 2015) 
110 ibid; See also, Law Society of Kenya, Lawyers Concerned Over Case Backlog, available at, 
http://www.lsk.or.ke/index.php/component/content/article/1-latest-news/420-lawyers-concerned-over-case-backlog, 
(accessed on April 12, 2015) 
111 Remarks by the KRA’s Chairman, Board of Directors on 22nd October 2013, at the Launch of 2013 Taxpayer’s Week, pg. 3, 
available at, http://www.revenue.go.ke/index.php/notices/speeches/844-board-24102013, (accessed on April 12, 2015) 
112 EU Commission (2011): (n.31), Appendix D: Country Study-Kenya,  para. 2.3.6.3 
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which the UKL sought to rely, did not form part of the Kenyan laws, and consequently needed to 
be disregarded.  
 
In finding for UKL, the High Court found that the subject provision (Section 18(3)) was 
ambiguous and that in the absence of guidelines in the Kenyan law on how to determine an arm’s 
length price, UKL was in law entitled to rely on the OECD TP Guidelines (UKL had in fact 
relied on the Cost Plus Method) in establishing the transfer price for its inter-company 
transactions. The Court stated that: 
 
‘I have no doubt in my mind that the OECD principles on income and on capital and the 
relevant guidelines such as “Transfer Pricing” principles, […..] are not just here for relaxed 
reading. These have been evolved in other jurisdictions after considerable debate and taking 
into account appropriate factors to arrive at results that are equitable for all parties. The ways 
of doing modern business have changed very substantially in the last 20 years or so and it 
would be fool-hardy for any court to disregard internationally acceptable principles of 
business as long as these do not conflict with our own laws. To do so would be highly short-
sighted.113 
What is not clear from the Unilever decision is whether the judge would have reached the same 
conclusion on the applicability of the OECD TP Guidelines in Kenya if it was the KRA which 
had sought to rely on the OECD principles to enforce taxation of MNEs transactions in situations 
where the provisions of the Kenyan ITA were unclear. In the author’s opinion, the finding would 
have been the exact opposite. This view is supported by the current literalistic approach 
employed by the Kenyan courts in interpretation tax statutes. This approach, which is based on 
Lord Russell’s dictum in the Duke of Westminster,114 a United Kingdom (UK) case,115 stipulates 
that a subject is not to be taxed according to what the court thinks to be the substance a 
transaction, but only on clear words of a statute. This approach has been applied by the High 
Court in many cases including the Keroche Industries case,
116
 and later confirmed by the Court 
of Appeal in the Stanbic Bank Limited v Kenya Revenue Authority,
117
 where the Court stated that 
‘tax laws are to be construed strictly’ and even proceeded to issue a direction to the lower courts 
that ‘the issue of adopting a purposeful approach as regard tax laws and statutes should never 
ever arise’ in Kenya.118   
Despite the tremendous contribution of the Unilever decision to the Kenyan tax arena, 
particularly relating to the development of transfer pricing as a concept, questions are still being 
asked as to whether there existed any sound legal foundations for the court, not only to 
recognize, but also to proceed and apply the OCED TP Guidelines in Kenya,  in resolving the 
                                                             
113 Unilever (n.1), p.13 
114 IRC v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1, at p. 19 
115 Decisions from the commonwealth countries, though not binding, are of persuasive authority in Kenya. See, the Kenyan 
case, C.A. Rashid Moledine v. Home Ginners (1967) E.A. at 655 
116
 Keroche Industries,( n.100) 
117 Stanbic Bank Kenya Limited v. Kenya Revenue Authority (2009)eKLR, p. 10, available at 
http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/61612/ (accessed on 11th April 2015) 
118 ibid, Nyamu J.; Kenya law is built on the doctrine of stare decisis where the decision of a higher Court binds all the lower 
courts. 
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subject dispute notwithstanding that the country is not a member of the OECD and was not itself 
involved in the drafting of the guidelines.
119
 
2.3.3.2 The Post Unilever Experience 
In his obiter dictum in the Unilever case, Visram J. also urged the KRA to take initiatives 
towards providing legislative guidance on transfer pricing issues, including APAs.
120
 The KRA 
took this advice and embarked on a journey that has largely defined the current transfer pricing 
regime in Kenya. However, contrary to the recommendation, no much progress has been made in 
the area of APAs. 
The first reaction by the KRA was to drop the Sara Lee Household & Body Care Ltd. v 
Commissioner of Income Tax,
 121
 another TP dispute which was then pending hearing in the High 
Court. Other similar disputes were also dropped without the deficiency notices being realised.
122
 
The second reaction by KRA was to pursue the enactment of the transfer pricing guidelines, 
which guidelines were issued in the form of the Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Rules 2006, 
which rules were to be effective 1
st
 from July 2006. Thirdly, the KRA established a transfer 
pricing unit within the LTO where most MNEs belong. The KRA also embarked on various 
capacity building and development initiatives including training staff and acquisition of a 
database for the purposes of testing arm’s length nature of MNEs transactions.123   
With these initiatives in place, the KRA from 2009 embarked on what may be referred as the 
second wave of TP audits. These audits have also resulted into a number of disputes, some of 
which are currently pending before the High Court. As of April 30, 2015, the following transfer 
pricing cases were pending in the High Court; 
i. Karuturi Limited (2013)124 
The taxpayer (Karuturi), a Kenyan company in the business of growing and exporting rose 
flowers entered into an agreement with Flower Express (FE), a related party, tax resident in 
Dubai, under which Karuturi would sell to FE roses on a free-on-board (Kenya) terms. However, 
before the roses could leave Kenya, they would be resold by FE to third parties at substantially 
higher prices. The third parties would then export the flowers to markets controlled by FE, 
especially in Europe. A TP adjustment on the sale between Karuturi and FE was made by the 
KRA and taxes of approximately 960 million (USD 10,347,830) demanded, hence the dispute. 
It is interesting to note that while the dispute is still pending in court, newspaper reports indicate 
that Karuturi is currently under financial distress and may have been put on liquidation.
125
 The 
liquidation process, if it proceeds, would in essence mean that the KRA’s chances of recovering 
                                                             
119 See for example, Bosire Nyamori (n. 14) 
120 Unilever (n.1) p.13   
121 Sara Lee Household & Body Care Limited v Commissioner of Income Tax, HCITA, 543 OF 2003 
122 Patrick Chege, (n 13) and (n.37), 
123
 EU Commission (2011): (n.31), Appendix D: Country Study-Kenya, p. 18 
124 Karuturi Limited v Commissioner of Domestic Taxes, Nairobi HCITA No. 7 of 2013 
125 George Omodi, ‘CfC Bank Puts Naivasha flower grower Karuturi up for sale’, Business Daily, (Nairobi, January 26, 2015) 
<http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/CfC-Bank-puts-Naivasha-flower-grower-Karuturi-up-for-sale-/-
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the taxes would be significantly reduced. Under the Kenyan laws,
126
 in winding up proceedings, 
tax claims and other levies owed to the government ranks secondary to secured creditors and can 
only paid after the secured creditors’ claims have been fully satisfied.127 And even then, taxes 
owed (and other government levies) are only treated as preference (alongside other preference 
creditors with which they rank pari passu) for up to one year’s tax assessment.128 The balance if 
any, rank s equal to the unsecured creditors and may only be paid where the assets are sufficient 
to repay all the debts,
129
 which is rarely the case. APAs, given their ability to resolve tax disputes 
ex ante, may be useful in helping a tax administration to avoid situations like this by ensuring 
that taxes are collected as and when they are due.  
ii. Ericsson Kenya Limited (2013)130 
 
Ericsson Kenya Limited (‘EKL’) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ericsson Telefonaktiebolaget  
LM (Sweden) which is also wholly owned by Ericsson AB-Sweden (‘EAB’).  EKL is therefore 
indirectly related to EAB within the meaning of Section 18(6) of the ITA as read together with 
Rule 2 of the TP Rules, 2006. 
 
In 2008 EKL and EAB entered into tripartite contracts with their common Kenyan clients via a 
Master Services Agreement Build Operate and Transfer, and Equipment Supply Contract and 
Implementation Services Contract, both relating to the sale of hardware, software and services. 
Under these contracts, EAB was to supply the equipment (hardware and software) while EKL 
was to provide local installation, support and maintenance services. 
According to the KRA, a tax audit for the 2007-2009 years of income revealed that EKL had 
made substantial losses under the contract. It is in fact the parties’ common ground that the 
losses were as a result of extra-ordinary costs incurred by EKL under the contract. The point of 
departure however is whether the incurring of these costs by EKL is to be attributed to the 
special relationship between EKL and EAB (so that a transfer pricing adjustment can be done) or 
whether the subject costs were as a result of factors unrelated to the entities’ association. It is 
EKL’s position that Section 18(3) of the ITA does not apply in this situation since the losses 
incurred were occasioned by factors unrelated to the relationship between EKL and EAB. The 
KRA thinks otherwise. 
Apart from the above projects, EKL also offered various services on behalf of EAB to their other 
related entities within the East African region, remuneration for which EKL benchmarked at 5% 
Full Cost Mark Up (‘FCMU’). According to KRA, the remuneration for these services was not 
appropriately benchmarked, and therefore an upward adjustment was made. KRA is of the view 
that a remuneration of 12% FCMU would be appropriate. It is important at this point to disclose 
that the author is personally involved in this matter and consequently, only general discussions 
on the case will be made without giving an opinion, one way or the other, on the merits of the 
case. See paragraph 2.3.3.3 below for more discussions on the case. 
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iii. Bamburi Cement Limited (2014)131    
Bamburi Cement Limited (‘BCL’), a cement manufacturer, is a company incorporated in Kenya 
and is part of Lafarge, a public limited company incorporated in France which owns 58.6% of 
BCL. Lafarge and BCL entered into a five year Trademark License and a General Assistance 
Agreement under which BCL would benefit from Lafarge’s manufacturing knowhow, trademark 
and logo and also from other various services from Lafarge. The remuneration for the entire 
agreement was bundled at an aggregate annual fee of 2% of the BCL’s consolidated annual net 
turnover. 
The dispute arose as a result of a tax audit by the KRA covering 2008-2012 years of income. 
Regarding provision of the ‘various services’ by Lafarge, the main question for determination is 
whether the costs for those services should be allowed against BCL’s income in the absence of 
proof of actual provision of those services. A related question also is whether the remuneration 
for the ‘various services’, which ranges from technical know-how, human resource to financial 
and commercial matters, ought to have been bundled together and payment made in lump sum 
without BCL specifically assigning each payment to a particular service. The KRA holds the 
view that the costs could only be allowable if BCL proved that the services were in fact rendered, 
and that each payment is linked to a corresponding service offered by Lafarge.  According to the 
KRA, the mere existence of the service centers is not by itself a proof that the services were 
actually rendered to BCL.  
Another question for determination is whether the Lafarge’s trademark and logo (‘L-Lafarge’) 
should be remunerated without proof of its relevance and value addition to BCL. The KRA has 
taken the position that having conducted a detailed analysis and tests in relation to the trademark 
and logo, no clear and identifiable benefit or value addition to BCL could be established, hence 
any payments associated with the logo was disallowed. 
Running through all the above issues is also the question of whether BCL was under paragraph 9 
of the TP Rules, 2006 obliged to maintain contemporaneously, documentation in respect of these 
transactions. The KRA contends that BCL did not only fail to maintain the requisite 
documentation at the time the transfer pricing was established, but that BCL also failed to 
produce such documents as and when required by the Commissioner under the TP Rules, 2006. 
The case is also pending hearing and given the author’s involvement in the matter, discussion on 
the case will equally be restricted. See paragraph 2.3.3.3 below for more discussions on the case. 
2.3.3.3 A General Assessment of the Cases 
An assessment of the above cases reveals a number of issues. First, as had already been pointed 
earlier, it is apparent that all these cases were commenced at the LC level before an appeal was 
made to the High Court in each case. It can therefore be safely concluded that currently, the 
preferred appellate procedure in TP disputes in Kenya follows the process established under the 
Kenyan ITA. This, in the author’s opinion is a positive result especially taking into account that 
as opposed to courts, tribunals are generally expected to be more specialised in tax and transfer 
pricing matters so as to competently resolve such disputes. It is against this background that it is 
recommended that qualifications for appointment to the Tribunal established under the TATA 
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should, in addition to the qualifications enumerated under Section 4(b) of the Act, also explicitly 
mention tax as one of the areas of specialization. It is noteworthy that a degree in tax was one of 
the requirements in the 2012 amendment to the ITA, but has been curiously omitted under the 
TATA.  
Second, a look at the sequence of the cases reveals a progression in complexity of the TP issues 
involved. The Unilever case which was the first TP dispute in Kenya involved a simple issue 
regarding the methodology to be used in determining the arm’s length price. Subsequent cases 
now involve more complex issues such as comparability analysis (Ericsson Kenya Limited) and 
those concerning intangibles and the concept of value addition (Bamburi Cement Limited). A 
possible explanation for this progression in complexity of the TP issues involved may be the fact 
that the initiatives so far undertaken by the KRA in the area of transfer pricing has helped it to 
developed requisite capacity to enable its TP team flag out some of the technical TP 
manipulations which in the past could go unnoticed. In the author’s opinion, this development is 
likely to make TP issues become even more critical, both to the taxpayers and to the KRA, 
especially in view of the fact that there is usually no single ‘right’ answer in transfer pricing 
disputes and that establishing the arm’s length price is not a price science and is quite 
subjective.
132
 
Third, the duration taken to finally have the TP disputes resolved, thus removing the 
uncertainties, is quite long in almost all the cases. The Unilever case took approximately 10 
years to be resolved. The dispute involved tax issues dating as far back as 1995 but was only 
resolved in October 2005 when the judgment was delivered. Ericsson Kenya Limited and 
Bamburi Cement Limited which are still pending in the High Court involve tax issues for 2007-
2009 and 2008-2009 years of income respectively. For both cases, it is approximately eight years 
and the uncertainties, for both the taxpayer and the tax administration still persist. This is even 
worse in the Karuturi Limited case where the company has reportedly been put under 
liquidation.
133
  
Finally, in all the cases, the audit periods covered are only for limited tax period. Under Section 
56(3) of the ITA, the KRA is only authorized to carry tax audits (absent any fraud or willful 
neglect on the part of the taxpayer) going back not more than seven years after the relevant year 
of income. In view of the fact that TP issues are not generally considered ‘fraudulent’ or ‘willful 
neglect’, then there may be instances where there are genuine TP adjustments that ought to have 
been made by the KRA but for the time limitation. As will be seen later in Chapters 3 and 4 
below, these are some of the issues that the adoption of an APA by a tax administration may help 
to ameliorate.  
2.4 The Article 25 Procedures (MAP, Arbitration and APA) 
The authority to conclude a Double Tax Agreement between the Government of Kenya and a 
foreign jurisdiction is vested on the Minister of Finance by Section 41 of the ITA. The provision 
also declares that such an agreement would supersede the other provisions of the ITA or any 
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other written law of the country in relation to income tax. These treaties are however subject to 
the Constitution of Kenya 2010, which recognizes them as part of the Kenyan law,
134
 but also 
declares its superiority over all Kenyan laws.
135
 
Kenya’s income tax treaty network is not very extensive, with only nine treaties currently 
operational.
136
 All the treaties have provisions the equivalent of the Article 25 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention. However, only two of these treaties (with India and with France) have a 
provision the equivalent of Article 9(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention regarding a 
corresponding adjustment. None of the treaties have a provision for arbitration.
137
  
Currently, there are no records of TP cases that have been resolved under the treaties, either by 
way of a corresponding adjustment under Article (Article 9(2)) or pursuant to the mutual 
agreement procedure (Article 25). In the circumstances, it may be concluded that in the context 
of Kenya, income tax treaties remain untested in resolving transfer pricing disputes. It is 
therefore against this background, and in view of the reported success of APAs in other 
jurisdictions that this research will now assess the APA programme with a view of exploring its 
applicability to the Kenyan tax system. It is however important to note that for treaty based 
dispute resolution mechanisms (including bilateral and multilateral APAs) to be more effective, 
it is necessary for a country to develop an extensive treaty network, especially with its major 
trading partners. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Kenya is currently working on the process of 
improving its network.
138
 It is therefore hoped that this exercise will help to improve the 
effectiveness of the treaty based mechanisms in resolving TP disputes as well. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3 ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS – OECD RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE SO FAR 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Transfer pricing disputes do not generally have a single ‘right’ answer and consequently the most 
acceptable outcomes in such cases are usually achieved through negotiations between the 
parties.
139
 The uncertainties involved in such disputes and the need for compromises during the 
negotiations requires the existence of a framework that encourages a principled approach to the 
negotiations so as to promote transparency and consistency.
140
 The ability of APAs to meet these 
features has seen the programme become popular in resolving TP disputes. According to a 2013 
survey,
141
 the level of satisfaction with APAs as a process of managing these disputes was found 
to be quite high, with 79% of the respondents recording their satisfaction.
142
 This trend has also 
been confirmed by the OECD which has stated that APAs have currently become more popular 
and effective in resolving transfer pricing disputes. According to the OECD, a significant 
number of its member countries have adopted APAs and that for those countries, they are so far 
satisfied, and that owing to this success, the use of APAs is projected to expand.
143
 
 
The above observations were made by the OECD in 1995. This chapter seeks to highlight the 
concept APAs and also to assess the extent, if any, to which its use has been embraced in a few 
selected countries. This will be done by first outlining the OECD recommendations on APAs, 
and then proceed to analyse how those recommendations have been implemented in practice by 
the US, an OECD member country with the longest experience with APAs. Experiences from 
China and India will also be considered as well to bring in the developing countries’ perspective.  
 
3.2 The OECD Recommendations on APAs 
 
Advance Pricing Agreement is an arrangement through which a taxpayer requests from one or 
more tax administration(s) a binding pricing settlement in respect of the taxpayer’s future 
transfer prices. Depending on the number of countries involved, APAs can either be unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral.
144
 In contrast to other transfer pricing dispute settlement and 
management mechanisms, APAs represent a cooperative approach where taxpayers and tax 
administrations jointly agree, prospectively (and in some cases retroactively) on an acceptable 
transfer pricing methodology to govern a particular transaction or groups of transactions 
(‘covered transactions’) for a fixed period of time.  
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According to the OECD TP Guidelines, APAs are intended not to substitute the traditional 
transfer pricing dispute resolution mechanisms, but to supplement them.
145
 The important role of 
APAs in managing transfer pricing disputes is also underscored by the UN manual on transfer 
pricing which, apart from acknowledging the OECD position, also points out that APAs provide 
the most efficient method of addressing TP disputes by preventing them before they arise.
146
 
 
APAs are different from the traditional private rulings. While a private ruling would typically 
concern a legal point and would cover only a specific transaction, APAs usually covers a 
taxpayer’s several (or even all) international transactions on a continuous basis.147 Additionally, 
while the facts of a transaction for a private ruling are normally not in dispute, the facts that 
underlie an APA request are very germane and would ordinarily be highly scrutinised.
148
 
 
The OECD TP Guidelines define an APA as ‘arrangements between a taxpayer and a tax 
authority that determine in advance how intra-group transactions, an appropriate set of criteria 
(e.g. method, comparables and appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future 
events) for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of 
time’.149  Ordinarily, an APA is not intended to settle specific transfer prices or profit margins for 
inter-company transactions, but only to agree on the methodology for determining those prices or 
profit margins.
150
 However, in certain cases, it may be possible to agree on a specific price or 
profit margins. This may be the case for example where an APA concerns a one-off 
transaction.
151
 How specific an APA can be, therefore depends on the reliability of the 
predictions and the critical assumption(s) that underlie those predictions.
152
 To enhance APAs’ 
reliability, the use of comparables and adjustment to such comparables or profit ranges is 
recommended.
153
 
 
Apart from being used as a mechanism for establishing the methodology for establishing the 
transfer prices or profit margins, APAs may also be used in resolving income attribution and 
allocations issues arising under Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention.
154
  
3.2.1 Types of APAs 
 
There are three different types of APAs, namely unilateral, bilateral or multilateral APAs. 
Unilateral APA refers to an agreement between the taxpayer and a single tax administration. The 
power to enter into this type of agreement is normally drawn from the country’s domestic law. It 
is therefore not an option where a country’s national laws do not allow such an agreement.155  
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While it may be relatively cheaper in terms of resources and time to conclude a unilateral APA 
compared to bilateral or multilateral APAs, its main drawback is its inability to relieve double 
taxation that may occur to an entity as a result of its dealings with associated enterprises in other 
jurisdictions. For this reason, the OECD Guidelines recommends the use of bilateral or 
multilateral APAs.
156
According to Monsenego (2013), a unilateral APA may even increase a 
MNE’s exposure to audit and more stringent conditions in the other jurisdictions not involved in 
the APA.
157
 
 
Despite these shortcomings, unilateral APAs may still be very useful especially in cases where, 
for example, the governments of the countries involved in the covered transaction do not have a 
tax treaty or where a cost-benefit analysis would still supports the idea of a unilateral APA.
158
  
 
Bilateral APAs on the other hand refers to agreements entered into between a taxpayer and two 
countries in which the different entities of the taxpayer are tax resident. This is generally done 
through the mutual agreement procedure (Article 25 OECD Model Tax Convention) which 
provides a framework for parties to consult together for the purposes resolving by mutual 
agreement ‘any difficulties or doubts arising from the interpretation or application of the 
Convention’ including for purposes of eliminating double taxation in cases not provided under 
the treaty.
159
Additionally, the countries’ domestic rules in most cases also provide more 
elaborate rules on how the bilateral APAs may be managed, including how to monitor their 
application. The OECD Guidelines also cite ‘executive power conferred on the heads of tax 
authorities, as another possible legal basis through which a country may negotiate bilateral or 
multilateral APAs.
160
 However, in the author’s opinion, in countries such as Kenya where the 
country’s constitution places a limit on the extent to which public officers may exercise their 
powers, especially in relation to taxation, this would only extend to procedural aspects as 
opposed to substantive taxation rules.
161
  
 
It is important to note that the existence of domestic rules is not a prerequisite for a country’s 
engagement bilateral APAs.
162
 The MAP process may still be used to negotiate APAs even 
where the domestic laws of a country do not permit a tax administration to enter into a binding 
agreement with taxpayers.
163
 The power to negotiate APAs in such cases will normally be drawn 
from the treaty itself which in most cases override national laws.
164
 The main advantage of a 
bilateral APA is its ability to bind more than one jurisdiction hence securing more certainty as 
compared to unilateral APAs. 
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Multilateral APAs on the other hand are agreements made with more than two tax 
jurisdictions.
165
 Under this arrangement, a taxpayer will normally approach each of the subject 
jurisdictions with an overall proposal, which will then be considered by the participating 
jurisdictions at a multilateral forum.
166
 Although a multilateral APA may provide more certainty 
to a taxpayer than the other two types of APAs, it suffers from a number of shortcomings, key 
among them the concern that tax treaties are typically bilateral and are therefore not designed for 
a multilateral process and consequently, there may be some difficulties in finding a mechanism, 
not only to negotiate, but also to implement these kinds of agreements.
167
 There is also the 
problem of exchange of information and the attendant confidentiality concerns, especially where 
there is no exchange of information articles in the respective countries’ treaties.168 Despite these 
challenges, the OECD has noted that multilateral APAs have ‘become the norm’ in the global 
trading field.
169
 In fact, the OECD encourages the use of bilateral and multilateral APAs and 
states that ‘[w]herever possible, an APA should be concluded on a bilateral or multilateral 
basis’.170  
 
3.2.2 The APA Lifecycle  
 
The negotiation of bilateral and multilateral APAs and the subsequent agreement is basically a 
matter between the competent authorities of the countries involved. Unilateral APAs on the other 
hand is negotiated directly by the MNE concerned with the country in which it is tax resident. 
However, in both cases, it is always the taxpayer who commences the process by filing a request 
for an APA.  According to the OECD, the following process is recommended:  
i. Pre-Filing Conference 
 
Prior to making a formal request, a preliminary meeting between the taxpayer and the tax 
administrations should be held to discuss the suitability of the proposed APA and also to share 
and understand each other’s expectations and objectives.171 Other issues that are to be considered 
should include the nature of the proposed transaction, the methodology and an economic analysis 
of the chosen transfer pricing method and the critical assumptions, if any, that underlie the 
transaction in general and the chosen methodology in particular. 
172
 The taxpayer normally has 
the option of attending the meeting on an anonymous or named basis, but must nevertheless 
provide sufficient information for the purposes of making the meeting productive. The 
information provided however remains confidential.
173
 One of the key concerns at this stage is 
how to balance confidentiality requirements against the need for clarity and sufficiency of 
information to be provided. In the author’s view, maintaining confidentiality while at the same 
time disclosing requisite information to enable the tax authority to sufficiently understand the 
proposed transaction may be quite tricky.    
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ii. Formal Request  
 
This refers to the lodgment by the taxpayer of a detailed proposal providing sufficient 
information and documentation about the proposed transactions, providing details of among 
others, the chosen TP method and the information necessary to support the proposed 
methodology.
174
 Other key information to be availed at this point includes the details about the 
comparable pricing information
175
, critical assumptions on which the proposed methodology is 
based,
176
 how to deal with any unexpected results
177
 and the proposed duration of the APA.
178
 
iii. Review and Acceptance: Legal Effect and possible ‘Rollback’ 
 
After receipt of the proposal, the tax administrations should first undertake a ‘fact finding, 
review and evaluation’ of the proposal to verify the accuracy of the information provided by the 
taxpayer before commencing the substantive mutual discussions on the proposal.
179
 Once an 
agreement is reached, the parties are to prepare a draft mutual agreement which should thereafter 
be passed over to the taxpayer for his consent.
180
 To give effect to the APA as between the 
taxpayer and the tax administration in which it is tax resident, the agreement will then have to be 
recognised under the applicable domestic legislation.
181
 Once so recognised, the terms and 
conditions of the APA becomes binding on both the taxpayer and the tax administration in 
relation to the covered transactions, subject to any changes in the law or the facts that underlie 
the agreement.
182
 Further, subject to the applicable treaty and domestic law requirements, the tax 
administrations, may either with the concurrence of the taxpayer, or on its own motion, apply the 
agreed methodology retrospectively (rollback) to resolve past years’ audit issues.183   
iv. Monitoring: Compliance Report and Audit (Revocation, Cancellation, Revision) 
 
Once in place, the tax administration is to monitor taxpayer compliance with the terms and 
conditions of the APA. As a condition of the agreement, the taxpayer will normally be required, 
over and above its annual tax return, to file an annual report outlining its actual operations, with 
the details of the extent to which it has complied with the APA, including information as to 
whether the critical assumptions still hold.
184
 Further, the tax administration may also still carry 
out an audit of the taxpayer’s operations, but such audits will only be limited to verifying the 
taxpayer’s compliance with the terms and conditions of the APA and also to determine whether 
the underlying assumptions are still relevant.
185
 Where non-compliance is established or where 
the critical assumptions are no longer valid, depending on the nature of non-compliance and 
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subject to the terms of the APA and the relevant domestic legal provisions, the agreement may 
be revised
186
, cancelled
187
 or revoked.
188
 
v. Renewal  
 
An APA may be renewed by the consent of all the parties to it, and subject to any adaptations as 
may be necessary, the renewal process is to follow the same procedures as the initial APA 
request.
189
  
 
3.3 APA in Practice – A Survey of Selected Jurisdictions 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
Japan was the first country to introduce APA in 1987. This was only one year after the country 
had enacted its transfer pricing legislation. According to the Japan National Tax Agency, APAs 
were intended to aid in the enforcement of transfer pricing regulations and at the same time 
guarantee predictability to MNEs regarding the tax treatment of their inter-company dealings by 
ensuring ‘administrative confirmation on the most rational method of calculating the arm’s 
length price.’190 
 
After Japan, APA was subsequently adopted in the United States by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) which introduced the programme in 1991 through Procedure 91-22. In the US, the 
programme came about as a result of a push by taxpayers who felt that the other alternative 
transfer pricing compliance and resolution mechanisms were not only too adversarial, but were 
also unproductive.
191
 Other countries that also introduced the programme prior to the 1995 
OECD TP Guidelines include Canada (1994), New Zealand (1994), Australia (1995) and Mexico 
(1995). Subsequent to the 1995 OECD TP Guidelines which promoted APAs, several other 
countries including, South Korea (1996), China (1998), the UK (1999), France (1999), 
Netherlands (1999) and Germany (2000) also embraced the programme.
192
 According to the 
Deloitte 2015 Global Transfer Pricing Survey, over 50 of the 67 countries covered had some 
form of APA provision in their tax legislation as of 31
st
 December 2014.
193
 
                                                             
186
 Revision would be done to reflect the any changes to the conditions that underlie the agreement. The revised APA should 
state its effective date and any transitional arrangements, if any (See OECD TP Guidelines, Annex to Chapter IV, paras 83-5). 
187 The effective date of the cancellation may either be from a specific date or for a particular tax year or accounting period (see 
OECD TP Guidelines, Annex to Chapter IV, para,  79) 
188 Revocation has a retroactive effect and operates as if the APA did not exist in the first place. It is the most drastic action and 
it is therefore recommended that it should only be resorted to in exceptional circumstances. See  Paras OECD TP Guidelines, 
Annex to Chapter IV, paras, 77-8) 
189 Where there have not been any material changes to the facts, the level of the information required may be significantly 
reduced (see, OECD TP Guidelines, Annex to Chapter IV para 87).  
190 NTA, APA Program Report 2009 (November 2010), p3 
191 Michelle Markham (n.20), p.23-4 
192 NTA, APA Program Report 2009 (November 2010), p3 
193 Deloitte, The 2015 Global Transfer Pricing Country Guide Available at <http://www2.deloitte.com/.../dttl-tax-global-transfer-
pricing-guide-2014.pd > (accessed in April 1, 2015); The countries include, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, 
Columbia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland*, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong 
Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland*, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg*, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands,  New Zealand, Norway*, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovakia, Spain, 
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The countries however follow different approaches in implementing and administering the APA 
programme. Some Jurisdictions like China impose a monetary threshold for a transaction to 
qualify into the programme,
194
 while others like the United Kingdom consider the degree of 
complexity of the transfer pricing issues involved in the proposed transaction as the criteria.
195
 
The Deloitte survey also reveals that countries such as the United States, Austria, Greece, and 
Germany charge application fee for taxpayers to access the programme while others like 
Australia, France and New Zealand imposes no application fee. Others like Canada for example, 
does not levy any application fee but requires the taxpayer to reimburse the tax administration 
the ‘out-of-pocket’ expenses incurred in the APA negotiations.196 
Some countries such as Canada, China, Japan and the US periodically publicise their APA 
programme reports in their websites. India introduced APAs in 2012 and since then has also been 
issuing press releases on the performance of their programme.
197
    
3.3.2 China 
 
The Chinese APA was introduced in 1998, when the same was included as ‘one of the other 
reasonable methods’ that can be used to determine the arm’s length price in a related party 
transaction.
198
 The country offers unilateral, bilateral and multilateral APAs. For a transaction to 
be admitted to the programme there is a requirement that the subject transaction must be over 
CYN 40 million. Currently, APAs are regarded as the most effective way of resolving TP 
disputes in China.
199
 
 
According to the country’s 2013 APA Report,200 China had from 2005 to 2013 executed a 
cumulative total of 104, 67 APAs comprising of 67 unilateral and 37 bilateral APAs. In 2013 
alone, a total of 19 APAs were signed, 11 being unilateral and the rest being bilateral APAs. No 
multilateral APA has been executed by the country so far.
201
 The completion time has generally 
been less than two years.  63 percent of the APAs that we signed in 2013 were completed within 
one year. Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM) was the dominant transfer pricing method 
and was used in 85 percent of the cases. The programme has a rollback option which has been 
used to resolve outstanding transfer disputes dating as far back as 10 years.
202
 A request for 
renewal of an APA must be filed 90 days prior to its expiration. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
APAs are currently available only for natural gas and there is also an ongoing pilot scheme for the roll out of formal APAs for 
other sectors. 
194 To qualify, the transaction involved should be over RMB 40 Million (see See, SAT, China Advance Pricing Arrangement: 
Annual Report, Available at <http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/2013/n2925/n2957/c1371176/part/1371191.pdf.> accessed on April 
27, 2015  
195 See HMRC, Policy Paper: Statement of Practice 2(2010) (HRMC 2013), available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-practice-2-2010/statement-of-practice-2-2010> accessed on 
April 27, 2015  
196 See, Deloitte, The 2015 Global Transfer Pricing Country Guide (n. 193) 
197 See for example CBDT Press Release (March 31, 2014), available at, 
<http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Lists/Press%20Releases/Attachments/2/Press_Release.pdf>, accessed on April 30, 2015 
198 SAT, Advance Pricing Arrangement Annual Report 2013, p. 5 
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 Jinyan Li, ‘Transfer pricing disputes in China’ in Eduardo Baistrocchi & Ian Roxan, Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes:A global 
Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2012)  p.665 
200 SAT, Advance Pricing Arrangement Annual Report 2013 
201 ibid, p. 21 
202 ibid, p. 17 
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The uniqueness of the Chinese APA is the availability of a multi-stage dispute resolution 
mechanism for the programme. Under Article 63 of the Implementing Measures, where, during 
the implementation of the APA, there occurs any disagreements between the tax authority and 
the taxpayer, the parties are first encouraged to resolve the same through negotiations and where 
those negotiations fail, the case may be taken to a higher level within the tax administration and 
finally, for bilateral and multilateral APAs to the State Administration of Taxation. It is only 
where the disagreement still persists that the APA may be terminated.
203
 
3.3.3 India 
The APA programme was introduced in India with effect from July 1, 2012 vide the Finance 
Act, 2012.  Detailed rules implementing the programme were introduced by the Central Board of 
Direct Taxes (CBDT) vide the official gazette of August 31, 2012. Since its introduction, the 
Indian APA has been highly embraced by taxpayers, with some practitioners remarking that it 
has provided a ‘welcome opportunity’ to prevent transfer pricing controversies and thus 
eliminate uncertainties associated with future litigation.
204
 According to CBDT press release,
205
 
146 applications were received in the first year (period ending March 31, 2013). As an indication 
of what could be seen as the programme’s wide acceptance by the Indian MNEs, the number of 
APA applications increased in the second application period (period ending March 31, 2014), to 
over 235 applications, representing an increase of over 70 percent.
206
  
Whereas the Indian APA programme offers unilateral, bilateral and multilateral options, most of 
the agreements that have so far been signed are unilateral in nature. Of the applications received 
in the second application period, approximately 88 percent of them were for unilateral APAs and 
most of which were completed within one year.
207
 The dominance of unilateral APAs over the 
other types of APAs has been speculated by some to be as a result of India’s stand on 
corresponding adjustment clause under its income tax treaties, which has prevented it from 
entering into bilateral and multilateral APAs with some of its major trading partners such as 
France and Germany, with whom India does not have an equivalent of Article 9(2) of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention.
208
 It is this author’s opinion that the dominance of unilateral APAs could 
also be attributable to the fact that India, like all other countries at their early stages with the 
programme are still be down in the learning curve and hence may be more guarded when it 
comes to bilateral or multilateral APA requests.  
Effective October 1, 2014, India introduced a rollback option for the programme and taxpayers 
will from then  be able to apply the APA agreement for a period of four years preceding the first 
                                                             
203 SAT, China Advance Pricing Arrangement: Annual Report,  p. 19;      see also Jinyan Ali, ‘Transfer Pricing disputes in China’ in 
Eduardo Baistrocchi and Ian Roxan (eds), Resolving Transfer Pricing Disputes: A Global Analysis, (Cambridge University Press 
2012)  
204 See Vijay Iyer, ‘Advance Pricing Agreements-Addressing the Taxpayers Needs’ in EY India Tax Insights (2014)April-June, p. 2 
205 CBDT Press Release (March 31, 2014), available at, 
<http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Lists/Press%20Releases/Attachments/2/Press_Release.pdf>, accessed on April 30, 2015  
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 Ernst & Young, India Advance Pricing Agreements: Providing Transfer Pricing Certainty (EY, 2014), p.3, available at 
,<http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-India-Advance-Pricing-Agreements/$FILE/EY-India-Advance-Pricing-
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year in which the APA was applicable.
209
 The term of APAs is fixed to not more than five years 
with an option for renewal.
210
 One major drawback of the Indian APA is its lack of a 
confidentiality clause, which essentially means that information obtained under the APA process 
may be used by the tax administration against the taxpayer in future audit or litigation.
211
 This 
may be even worse where the APA negotiations fail. 
3.3.4 The US 
 
The United States’ Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced the APA programme in 1991 vide 
Revenue Procedure 91-22,
212
 and the country has since executed more than 1,400 APAs.
213
 
Effective 27
th
 February 2012, the APA programme was merged with the MAP programme and 
consequently renamed as Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement Programme. According to the 
IRS, this merger has increased the programme’s efficiency by eliminating the ‘two “handoffs"’ 
that existed under the prior system where the APA team could only develop the IRS position but 
was not responsible for the APA discussions with the treaty partners. The reverse was also the 
case with the office of the US Competent Authority.
214
   
   
According to the IRS 2014 APA report,
215
 101 APAs were executed in 2014, with over 80 
percent of them being bilateral and the balance being unilateral.
216
 Although this was a slight 
reduction from 2013 and 2012 figures which stood at 145 and 140 respectively,
217
 it still 
reflected a significant increase in the number of APAs concluded prior to the 2012 merger 
which, as seen above, the IRS has credited with the greater processing efficiencies. The 
efficiencies brought about by the 2012 merger even becomes clearer when one contrasts the 
current statistics with the 2011 report where only 43 APAs were reported to have been 
finalized.
218
 The average processing time during the 2014 period was 38.5 months, which, 
though representing approximately six months decrease from the 2013 figures, still exhibited 
some improvement from the 2011 rate which stood at 40.7 months.
219
  
Regarding the term of the APAs, although Rev. Proc. 2006-9 prescribes a term limit as five 
years, the actual term is in practice determined on a case-by-case basis.  The 2014 statistics 
indicate that more than 40 percent of the APAs concluded were actually for a term of more than 
five years, 10 percent of which had a term of ten years or longer despite the fact that the initial 
applications in most of those cases were for a term of five years. According to the IRS, the 
longer terms were granted ‘to ensure reasonable amount of prospectivity in the APA term.’220 
Practitioners have also observed that the longer period is normally applicable where either an 
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application took too long to complete or where additional years are required to address some 
difficult issues.
221
 
The report also reveals that most (over 80 percent) of the APAs completed in 2014 were bilateral 
with the rest being unilateral. On the type of transactions covered, 36 percent involved sale of 
tangible goods while 40 percent involved services. The predominant transfer pricing 
methodology was the profit methods with Comparable Profits Methods being used in 78 percent 
of the cases. 
The US APA has a provision for renewal, rollback and also for confidentiality of the information 
received in the process of negotiating an APA.
222
 The country charges a user fee for the 
programme, with the current fees ranging between USD 10,000 to 50,000 depending on the 
nature of the request and the size of taxpayer involved.
223
  
An analysis of the countries’ APA reports reveals that the US has the highest proportion of 
bilateral APAs over unilateral APAs, followed by China and India respectively. Conversely, 
India has the highest proportion of unilateral APAs compared to its bilateral APAs.  While it is 
acknowledged that this trend could be partly attributable to the fact that the US may be having a 
more elaborate treaty network,
224
 there is also the possibility that it could as well be attributable 
to the stage at which the respective countries are with the implementation of the APA 
programme. Early implementers like the US (1991) now appears to have gained more 
experience, hence more confidence to engage in bilateral APAs and even multilateral APAs. 
India on the other extreme, still being less experienced with the programme, appears to be more 
guarded, choosing instead to initially focus on unilateral APAs as they build the requisite 
experience and confidence to be able to engage in bilateral or even multilateral negotiations. It is 
submitted that this would be the correct approach for a country intending to introduce the 
programme for the first time. In fact, even for the US, its first APA report which published in 
2000,  approximately 10 years after its first implementation of the programme, indicates that 
unilateral APAs then constituted almost 50 percent of the total applications,
225
 compared to the 
current 20 percent.
226
 
3.4 Advantages of APAs 
 
From the above survey, it is apparent that APAs have helped to resolve a significant number of 
TP issues, with some countries such as the US executing as high as 145 APAs in a single year. 
The experiences from China and India similarly reveal a considerable reliance by MNEs on the 
programme. It is evident that APA has been used in these cases to minimise risk of transfer 
pricing adjustment, thus ensuring certainty in business decisions and in tax treatment of inter-
company transactions. The OECD TP Guidelines also cites this as the programme’s main 
                                                             
221 See for example, Darrin Litsky, ‘2014 U.S. APA Report Shows Program Holding Steady’ (2015), Deloitte Global Transfer 
Pricing, April, 10, p.2, available 
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advantage.
227
 The certainty thus offered, has the effect of preventing expensive and often time 
consuming audits and litigation.
228
 Additionally, due to the cooperation involved and the non-
adversarial nature of the negotiation process, there is the likelihood of an enhanced, and free 
flow of information between the tax administration and the taxpayer,
229
 which, apart from 
facilitating the negotiations, also serves to place the revenue authority in a position to gain a 
useful insight into the operations of the MNE involved. This insight is particularly crucial since it 
enables the tax authority to understand a taxpayer’s operational structures including, the 
functions, assets and risks; factors which are key ingredients for the determination of the correct 
arm’s length price or profit margin.230 The APA process, especially bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations may also be useful in enhancing understanding and cooperation between the treaty 
partners. However, to be able to get increased benefits offered by the APA programme, it is 
imperative that a country expands its treaty network, especially with its major trading partners. 
3.5 Disadvantages of APAs 
 
Despite the fact that APAs significantly reduces uncertainties associated with the determination 
of the arm’s length price in inter-company transactions, the programme is not itself a silver bullet 
when it comes to TP issues, which are inherently difficult. The programme’s adoption cannot in 
therefore magically make these difficult TP issues go away.
231
 Additionally, due to the difference 
in their interests, negotiations between a taxpayer and a tax administration may still be quite 
contentious, especially where difficult TP issues like high value intangibles are involved.
232
 
Further, the time and costs involved both for the tax administration and the taxpayer, especially 
at the initial stages of the programme’s implementation, is one of the biggest drawbacks of the 
programme.
233
 Other shortcomings of the programme include the fact that the process may be 
shunned by some taxpayers who may view it as amounting self-reporting of their sensitive tax 
planning information to a tax authority, with the consequence that such information may even be 
used against them, especially where the APA negotiations fail.
234
 There is also the possibility 
that most of the companies that would be interested in the APA process are large companies with 
good compliance history. Therefore committing resources to process an APA application from 
such taxpayers instead directing the resources towards investigating less complaint taxpayers 
may be seen as non-optimal use of resources since the risk of loss of tax revenue is always higher 
in the latter case.
235
 
 
Apart from the operational and administrative issues, there are also a number of legal strictures 
that the APA programme is expected to comply with.  The programme must not only exist 
harmoniously with the other provisions of a country’s tax system, but must also be compatible 
with the country’s other legal and constitutional provisions. Chapter 4 below discusses, from 
Kenya’s perspective, some of the legal considerations that are crucial for the successful 
implementation and management of the APA programme. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4 ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS – LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The implementation of the APA programme brings to the fore a number of legal and 
administrative issues. While the author acknowledges that administrative considerations such as 
the availability of adequately trained staff to run the programme are crucial, such considerations 
however fall outside the scope of this research and will not therefore be covered. This chapter is 
only be devoted to the examination of the legal considerations that are likely to arise, either at the 
implementation stage, or in the course of running the APA programme. For the purposes of this 
research, some of the issues that will be discussed include; the legal basis of APAs, 
confidentiality versus transparency issues, the binding nature of APAs and the equality and 
equity issues. The issues will be analysed from the perspective of the Kenyan legal and 
constitutional system while drawing where relevant, from the experiences in China, India and the 
US. 
4.2 The Legal basis of APAs 
 
While unilateral APAs will normally be entered into on the basis of the existence of such powers 
in the domestic law, bilateral or multilateral APAs can only be entered into through the mutual 
agreement procedure.
236
 Despite the fact that APAs are not expressly mentioned under the 
mutual procedure article (Art. 25 OECD Model Tax Convention), Paragraph 3 of the Article 
provides a framework for the contracting parties to consult together for the purposes resolving, 
by mutual agreement, ‘any difficulties or doubts arising from the interpretation or application of 
the Convention,’ including for purposes of eliminating double taxation in cases not provided 
under the treaty.
237
 The OECD TP Guidelines clarifies that since bilateral APAs have as their 
main aim the elimination of double taxation which arise as a result of transfer pricing cases 
where there are normally ‘doubts and difficulties’ as to the application of the treaty, it can 
therefore be said to be properly falling under Article 25.
238
 The exchange of information articles 
(for example those based on Article 26 OECD Model Tax Convention) are equally relevant since 
the participating jurisdictions needs to share information regarding the taxpayer’s operations in 
their respective jurisdictions.  
 
China,
239
 India
240
 and the US
241
 have all incorporated in most of their income tax treaties a 
provision for a corresponding adjustment. Also included in these treaties is a provision for the 
mutual agreement procedure, enabling treaty partners to consult with a view resolving any 
disputes that may arise under the treaties. It is noteworthy that both China and India under their 
respective policies on income tax treaties holds the view that in the absence of a provision 
equivalent to Article 9(2) OECD Model Tax Convention in any of their treaties precludes the 
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question of a corresponding adjustment from becoming the subject of negotiations under the 
mutual agreement article.
242
  
 
In the context of Kenya, only two
243
 of the country’s nine income tax treaties currently in force 
have a provision for a corresponding adjustment. All the nine treaties nevertheless have a 
provision for the mutual agreement procedure, including a provision equivalent of Article 25(3) 
of the OECD Model Tax Convention. Kenya however does not have any particular treaty policy, 
similar to Indian or Chinese positions precluding double taxation issues arising under Article 9 
form being the subject of MAP where paragraph 2 of the Article is not included in a treaty.    
 
According to the OECD, the MAP process is particularly appropriate for negotiating bilateral or 
multilateral APAs, especially where the domestic laws of a country do not permit tax 
administrations to enter into a binding agreement on tax issues.
244
 The power to negotiate APAs 
in such cases will therefore be drawn from the treaty itself, which in most cases override national 
laws.
245
 It can therefore be safely concluded that even in the absence of a specific APA 
legislation, Article 25 (3) in the Kenyan income tax treaties, when read together with section 41 
of the ITA,
246
 would form the legal basis in Kenya for bilateral and multilateral APAs. Unilateral 
APAs would however still require a specific legislation authorising such agreements. As seen in 
Chapter 3 above, all the three countries under study have enacted a specific domestic legislation 
on APAs to supplement their respective mutual agreement procedure article. 
 
The need for a domestic legislation is necessitated by the fact that as opposed to unilateral APAs, 
bilateral or multilateral APAs are ordinarily between the competent authorities of the 
participating countries, there is therefore the need for a legal procedure to make the agreement 
binding by creating a legal nexus between the subject taxpayer and the tax authority of the 
country in which the entity is tax resident. China
247
, India
248
 and the USA
249
 have all enacted a 
domestic legislation anchoring APAs in the respective countries’ legal system. Such domestic 
legislations also provide for other supplementary issues such as documentation, filing and 
monitoring which are pertinent to the smooth running of the programme. However since bilateral 
or multilateral APAs involves other jurisdictions, the supplementary issues as provided under 
such domestic legislation must not be consistent with the APA itself.
250
  
 
The APA (agreement) itself must therefore comply with the domestic legislation and any 
representation made under the agreement which is not statutorily backed becomes void. APAs 
are subject to the law and therefore any change of law in a country renders ineffective, any 
portion of the agreement which is not in conformity with the new legal position.
251
 In the contect 
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of Kenya, the primacy of statutory provisions over any representations or agreements by a public 
officer was confirmed in the Shake Distributors case,
252
 where the court stated that a public body 
cannot make a promise which is inconsistent with the express letter of the law.
253
 Additionally, 
in Kenya, such agreements (APAs), apart from complying with the statutory provisions, would 
also be expected to be consistent with the country’s Constitution, particularly Article 210 thereof 
which prohibits any levy, waiver or variation of any taxes except as by statute provided. 
4.3 Confidentiality-Transparency Conundrum 
 
In the course of negotiating APAs, MNEs are usually required to disclose, in good faith, all the 
information relevant to the proposed transactions so as to fully benefit from the guarantees 
presented by the programme.
254
 The information so provided may include sensitive commercial 
and proprietary information and there is therefore the need for a mechanism to ensure that such 
information is protected by the tax administration so as to guarantee the integrity of the 
process.
255
 Those who oppose disclosure cite taxpayer privacy and confidentiality rights.
256
 On 
the other hand, there is the equally forceful argument in favour of the need for disclosure of such 
information, with the proponents for disclosure putting forward as their main justification the 
need for public oversight and the need to eliminate the possibility and or perception of ‘secrete 
deals’.257  
 
Both the US
258
 and China
259
 APA programmes have confidentiality provisions exclusively 
directed towards the information obtained during the APA process. India on the other hand lacks 
such a provision but has a general confidentiality clause under Section 138 of the Indian ITA, 
1961 which leaves it to the discretion of the Commissioner to decide whether or not to disclose 
taxpayer information. The Commissioner is to release such information where in his opinion 
there exists sufficient public interest to warrant disclosure. The Commissioner’s decision on the 
question is declared final and not subject to question in any court of law.
260
 Practitioners have 
commented that because of this, the Indian APA programme lacks a ‘firewall provision’ and 
therefore information provided under the programme can be used by the tax administration 
against the taxpayer in other subsequent processes such as audit and litigation,
261
 especially 
where either the APA talks collapse, or where for some reason the taxpayer withdraws from the 
negotiations. 
 
In the US, Section 6103 of the tax code declares all taxpayer return information confidential. 
Section 6110 of the same code on the other had requires disclosure of all IRS ‘written 
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determinations.’ Additionally, Section 552 of the US Freedom of Information Act (‘FOIA’), 
subject to a few exceptions, imposes a duty on government institutions to publish and make 
available all information held by them. This tension of the laws led to a suit in 1996 regarding 
APAs by the US Bureau of National Affairs (‘BNA’) against IRS, the ‘BNA Case’. 
4.3.1 The BNA Case262 
 
This case was filed in 1998 against IRS under Section 6110 of the tax code and the FOIA 
seeking disclosure of information regarding all APAs executed by IRS. It was BNA’s argument 
that APAs contained declarations by IRS of the policy and legal interpretations of tax laws and 
were therefore ‘written determinations’ which ought to be published for the benefit of taxpayers 
generally. While objecting to publication, IRS took the position that APAs contain sensitive 
taxpayer information which is protected both under the FOIA exceptions, and under Section 
6103 of the of the tax code. The suit was however compromised when IRS ultimately agreed 
with BNA’s claim that APAs were in fact ‘written determinations’ and therefore subject to 
Section 6110 disclosures. IRS nevertheless still maintained that the disclosure was to be subject 
to the redaction of any identifying or protected taxpayer information.
263
 
 
However, following confidentiality concerns raised by among others, the country’s treaty 
partners who felt that any disclosures would effectively (but without due consultation) alter the 
terms and conditions of the earlier APAs,
264
 the US Congress amended both section 6103 and 
6110 of the revenue code classifying APAs as confidential return information and thereby 
preventing disclosure under both the FOIA and the tax code.
265
 The amendment also, in a bid to 
strike a balance between confidentiality and transparency concerns, required the IRS to publish 
annual reports on APAs, containing mainly statistical information without disclosing any data 
that would lead to the identification of any taxpayer.
266
 It is under this legislation that the first US 
APA report was released in March 2000,
267
 a format which has generally been accepted by all 
the stakeholders.
268
 
4.3.2 The Njoya Case269 
 
In Kenya, the confidentiality of taxpayer information is protected under Section 125 of the ITA 
which declares as secrete, ‘all documents and information relating to the income of a person and 
all confidential instructions in respect of the administration of the Income Tax Department.’ 
Such information is not to be produced, even in court, except where needed for the carrying into 
effect the provisions of the ITA itself, or to assist in the prosecution of an offence committed 
under the Act.
270
 Section 125 also provides a few exceptions where such information may be 
revealed. The exceptions are limited to among others, for revenue or statistical purposes,
271
 or 
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the release of such information under the exchange of information articles of the income 
treaties.
272
 
 
On the other hand, Article 35(1) of the Constitution,
273
 decrees the right of every Kenyan citizen 
to access information held by the state. Further, Article 2 of the Constitution provides for the 
supremacy of the Constitution and declares void, to the extent of the inconsistency, any law 
(including treaties to which Kenya is a party) not in harmony with the Constitution. On the other 
extreme, the right to privacy is also protected under Article 31 of the Constitution. To balance 
off, Article 24 of the Constitution prescribes the circumstances under which the rights granted 
under the constitution may be limited.  
 
It is this confidentiality – transparency conundrum that was the subject of litigation in the Njoya 
case.
 
The Petitioner having unsuccessfully sought from the KRA information regarding the 
payment of taxes relating to the Kenyan Members of Parliament, filed a constitutional petition in 
the High Court of Kenya, seeking a declaration that Section 125 of the ITA on which the KRA 
had relied on to deny his request unconstitutional and therefore void on the basis that violates 
Article 35(1) of the Constitution. 
 
In dismissing the Petition, the Court found that Section 125 ITA provides a reasonable 
justification under Article 24 of the Constitution for the limitation of the right of access to 
information under Article 35(1).
 274
 The Court quoting with approval the dictum in the Re Brown 
Trustee’s case275 stated that: 
 
Its (sic) important in the public interest that crime should be punished than that money 
should be recovered for revenue; but they are both things in the public interest, and if the 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, speaking through the mouth of the Lord Advocate, 
represent to me that in their view it will embarrass them in the future collection of revenue to 
have documents of that kind recovered, I am afraid I must, at whatever hazard to private 
litigation, give effect to that objection….276 
 
It is evident that both the Congress in the BNA case, and the Court in the Njoya case, sought to 
strike a balance between two legitimate but competing interests. While it was acknowledged that 
disclosure of tax information held by the public bodies is generally important, private interests 
were allowed to override public interest in both cases. In another Kenyan case, the Nairobi Law 
Monthly,
277
 the court was of the view that international standards relating to access to 
information require ‘maximum disclosure and limited exceptions’ and that the burden is on the 
person denying access to justify (based on ‘harm’ or ‘public interest’ considerations) his 
assertion for non-disclosure.
278
 Commercial interests and the integrity of the government 
decision making process are some of the reasons that were cited in that case as possible 
justifications for non-disclosure.
279
 The Court was of the view that in determining whether or not 
to uphold assertion for non-disclosure, the test should be that:  
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[t]he reasons for non-disclosure must relate to a legitimate aim; disclosure must be such as 
would threaten or cause substantial harm to the legitimate aim; and the harm to the 
legitimate aim must be greater than and override the public interest in disclosure of the 
information sought.
280
 
 
The OECD recommendations on APAs upholds taxpayer information confidentiality and 
provides that such information are not only to be protected from third party disclosures, but are 
also not to be used by the tax administration in subsequent audits or litigation where either no 
agreement is reached, or where the taxpayer, for some other reason withdraws from the APA 
process.
281
 This position is also confirmed by the UN TP Manual which observes that for APAs 
to be better embraced, it is desirable either to keep the APA and audit processes separate, or 
where for any reason that is not possible, then a limitation on the use of information provided 
during the APA process be imposed in the agreement itself.
282
 
 
Whereas the Court decision in the Njoya case did not address the extent to which (if any) tax 
information may be shared, the US Congress’ action in the BNA case seems to have struck the 
correct balance in the confidentiality-transparency puzzle. The publication of the annual APA 
reports serves to provide information which may be useful in providing some degree of guidance 
to all taxpayers, but also protects taxpayer private business information obtained in the course of 
negotiating the APAs.
283
  This has the effect of increasing public confidence in the fairness and 
transparency of the APA programme. In the opinion of the author, some level transparency may 
be achieved under the existing Section 125 (3) (b) of the ITA which authorizes disclosure of 
taxpayer information solely for revenue and statistical purposes. However, to guarantee certainty 
and uniformity in application, there may be need to introduce a special confidentiality-
transparency balancing provision under the TP Rules like in the US situation. 
4.4 Equity and Equality Issues 
 
The APA programme by its very nature inevitably raises both equity and equality concerns. The 
principle of equity demands that taxpayers who are in the same economic circumstances, 
whether domestic owned or foreign controlled, should be accorded equivalent tax treatment, 
irrespective of whether one is under the APA programme or not. An APA should therefore not 
have the effect of granting unequal treatment to taxpayers in the same legal and factual situation. 
Equivalence in treatment should cover both access to the programme, and the overall tax 
treatment of a taxpayer’s transactions.  
 
First, to guarantee neutrality as to the tax treatment of transactions, the OECD recommends that 
APA negotiations and the final agreement must respect the arm’s length principle,284 and that 
where the agreement goes beyond determining the methodology, then, abundant care must be 
taken to ensure that predictions as to the future transactions and the critical assumptions on 
which those predictions are based are reliable.
285
 To enhance reliability, taxpayers and tax 
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administrations are encouraged to ensure that the (critical) assumptions that underlie the APA 
agreement are (where possible) based on observable, reliable and independent data.
286
  
 
Given the prospective nature of APAs, the ability of a transaction to reflect the arm’s length 
price or profit margin (hence equivalence in treatment with other similar transactions) 
significantly depends on the reliability of the critical assumptions that underlie the agreement. It 
is therefore necessary to stipulate certain assumptions concerning legal, operational and 
economic conditions which are likely of affect the projected transactions and how those 
assumptions will impact the arm’s length nature of the transactions. These assumptions are 
considered ‘critical’ where the actual conditions existing at the time of the transactions would 
deviate from those that were projected at the time of the agreement, to the extent that the ability 
of the methodology to reliably reflect the arm’s length price is undermined. In such a case, the 
agreement would, depending on the extent of the departure, need to be revised or cancelled.
287
 
Through this mechanism, the arm’s length principle is protected thereby effectively ensuring 
equality in the treatment of transactions and taxpayers generally. 
 
In the US, claims of unequal treatment of taxpayers’ transactions under the APA programme 
became a point of litigation when GSK alleged that IRS had denied it an APA for its drug 
Zantac, whereas granting the same to its competitor, SmithKline Beecham Corp, in respect of 
Tagamet, a competing product. For this reason, GSK claimed from the IRS approximately USD 
1.7 billion in refund as a result of the alleged unequal treatment.
288
 Even though the case was 
eventually settled amicably,
289
 it serves to demonstrate the significance of the need to grant 
taxpayers who are similar circumstances equal treatment under the APA programme.  
 
Secondly, to be deemed equitable, access to APAs, like any other tax programme should be 
made available to all taxpayers in similar circumstances. The OECD however acknowledges that 
the very nature of the APAs, especially in relation to the high cost of administering the 
programme, may limit its accessibility only to large taxpayers.
290
 To address the possible equity 
issues, it is recommended that tax administrations should consider adopting specific programmes 
tailored towards the small and medium enterprises.
291
  
 
While China places a monetary threshold for the access to its APA programme,
292
 India and the 
US have no such restrictions. India
293
 and the US however charges user fee for the programme, 
with the US providing for different rates for large taxpayers and small businesses,
294
 China on 
the other hand has no such fee. Additionally the US has a simplified procedure for small 
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businesses.
295
 It is submitted that while placing a monetary threshold as a prerequisite for 
accessing the programme may seem plausible especially in a country with many MNEs, it is 
likely to be faulted for being restrictive, more so where such threshold is set too high and hence 
may be seen as inequitable in the circumstances. Charging of user fee on the other hand although 
may equally be questioned, appears to have been generally accepted as reasonable, especially 
where the fee is based on the value of the covered transaction like in the Indian situation. The 
UN TP Manual confirms that the charging of user fee for APAs has essentially been accepted by 
MNEs who regard the advantages to be derived under an APA as outweighing any 
inconvenience of paying such fees.
296
  
 
In the Kenyan context, equity and equality are national values embodied under Article 10 (2) (b) 
of the Constitution and are binding on all public officers, tax officials included. Additionally, the 
Constitution declares that every person has a right to equal protection and equal benefit of the 
law,
297
 and that the burden of taxation is to be shared fairly.
298
 This essentially means that any 
considerations for APAs in Kenya must address equity and equality issues by ensuring that no 
taxpayer benefits from a more favourable tax treatment as a result of the programme. This can be 
achieved by having an APA the operation of which respects the arm’s length principle and also 
one that is accessible to all taxpayers, irrespective of the size. To address equity issues, it may be 
necessary to consider a special APA programme specifically tailored for SMEs requiring a less 
elaborate procedure, reduced information requirements and charging of a reduced user fee as 
well. 
4.5 The Binding Effect of APAs 
 
Another legal question worthy consideration is the extent to which APAs, once executed, are to 
be binding both on the taxpayer and the tax administration. The OCED recommendations are that 
once registered, the terms and conditions of APAs becomes binding, both on the taxpayer and 
the tax administration in relation to the covered transactions, subject to any changes in the law or 
the facts that underlie the agreement.
299
 This position has been adopted by China
300
, India
301
 and 
the US.
302
 In all the three jurisdictions, the agreement may be declared void ab initio if it is 
established that the same had been entered by the taxpayer using fraudulent means or by 
misrepresentation of material facts, with the consequence that parties are to revert to their 
original positions as if the APA had not existed in the first place.
303
 On the other hand, where 
parties fail to meet the terms of the agreement or where there has been a change in the critical 
assumptions, the agreement will not remain binding and may either be cancelled, or where 
possible, be revised to reflect the changes.
304
  
 
The power of a tax administration to revoke, cancel or even to propose revision of the agreement 
may be challenged by a taxpayer, both on its procedural and substantive aspects. Substantively, it 
may be argued on behalf of a taxpayer that the basis of a proposed revision, cancellation or 
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revocation of an APA by the tax administration does not warrant such an action and would 
therefore be a breach of the taxpayer’s legitimate expectation. Regarding the procedural aspects, 
it may be argued that the procedural underpinnings concerning appropriate notifications, 
opportunity to be heard, among others had not been followed by a tax administration prior to the 
cancellation, revocation or proposal for revision. Related to the two issues also is whether a 
dispute arising under an APA in relation revocation, cancellation or revision of the agreement is 
to be determined by reference, exclusively, to the provisions of the agreement itself, or whether 
such a dispute may be resolved by resorting to the applicable revenue laws and procedures and 
the general administrative standards. 
 
The binding nature of APAs, the nature of applicable law and the power of the tax administration 
to cancel the agreement was recently the subject of a preliminary ruling in the Eaton v 
Commissioner case,
305
  where the IRS terminated retrospectively its APA with Eaton on the 
basis that the company had failed to comply with the terms of the agreement and demanded a 
sum of USD 360 million in taxes owed and also raised USD 51 million in penalties. The issue 
for determination was whether an APA is a binding contract, governed by the general contract 
law principles, or whether it is an administrative determination, governed by applicable revenue 
procedures. According to Eaton, the Commissioner had always represented that APAs are 
‘binding contracts’ and consequently, the general contact law principles were applicable in 
interpreting the agreement. The IRS on the other hand maintained that its power to cancel the 
APA was reserved in the agreement and that the Court can only intervene where it is 
demonstrated that there was abuse of discretion on the part of the tax administration. 
 
In finding for the IRS, the Court found that an APA agreement is governed by the applicable 
revenue procedures and that the Court’s jurisdiction is only limited to considering whether the 
Commissioner, in cancelling agreement had abused his discretion which is a factual question, 
and that the onus is on the taxpayer to prove that the decision was arbitrary and without any 
sound factual basis.
306
 The Court stated that:     
 
Petitioner and respondent are bound to the terms upon which they agreed. The APAs at issue 
provide that the applicable revenue procedures shall govern their legal effect and 
administration. The applicable revenue procedures reserve to respondent discretion to cancel 
the APAs at issue in certain circumstances. We are unpersuaded that the description of APAs 
as contracts renders ineffective the explicit terms and conditions that petitioner and 
respondent agreed govern the APAs at issue.
307
 
 
In Kenya, the right to fair administrative action is guaranteed under Article 47 of the Constitution 
which declares the right of every person to an ‘expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair’ process. In the relation to APAs, this would mean that before any revision, 
cancellation, termination or revocation is done by the tax administration, the taxpayer must not 
only be notified in writing,
308
 but must also be given an opportunity to heard. The right to be 
heard was declared by the Kenyan High Court in Total v Kenya Revenue Authority,
309
 as a 
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fundamental right which cannot be taken away irrespective of the hopelessness of one’s case.310 
This therefore means that any failure on the part of the tax administration to comply with the 
procedural underpinnings as may be agreed under the APA itself and also as guaranteed under 
the Constitution would render such actions void.
311
 It is also important to note that the 
constitutional thresholds would generally prevail, especially in instances where the APA itself 
provides a taxpayer with less procedural guarantees.
312
    
 
Additionally, the binding nature of APAs may be tested from the perspective of the ‘legitimate 
expectation’ principle. A tax administration’s proposal to revise, cancel or even revoke an APA 
may be opposed by a taxpayer on the basis that owing to the representations made by the tax 
administration, a taxpayer has in good faith relied on those representations to materially and 
significantly alter its financial and business position to the extent that it would be unfair for the 
tax authority to be allowed to renege on the agreement. This is particularly relevant where as a 
result of an APA; a taxpayer for example undertakes a massive investment, which may even 
involve heavy borrowing and other third party commitments.  
 
In Kenya, while there are cases where it has been held that there can be no legitimate expectation 
contrary to express provisions of the law,
313
 there are also cases where taxpayers’ assertion of 
legitimate expectations has been upheld. One such case is the Keroche Industries case where the 
Court stated that: 
 
One other reason why the Respondents conduct in changing the tariff and making its effect 
retroactive is illegal, is that it became penal and penal laws should not be retroactive. The 
applicant has in the circumstances of this case the right to protect its reliance on legitimate 
expectations [….]. The applicant in conducting its affairs is entitled to rely on certainty and 
regularity of law. The capriciousness, oppression and arbitrary application of the tariff 
retroactively is the antithesis of certainty and regularity of law. Having written to the 
Applicants’ predecessor and having by conduct made the applicant rely on it as the applicant 
having relied on the representations in planning its affairs, the law must intervene to protect 
settled expectations.
314
 
  
In the circumstances it is clear that a successful administration of an APA programme in Kenya 
would require more than just the agreement itself. Public officials administering the programme 
may not only be required to comply with the procedural aspects of the Kenyan law, but would 
also be expected to refrain from making representations (express or by conduct) which would be 
construed as creating legitimate expectation for the benefit of a taxpayer.   
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CHAPTER 5 
5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Despite the presence of newspaper reports indicating that the Kenya Revenue Authority could be 
considering implementing APAs,
315
 to date, the programme is yet to be implemented. It may be 
speculated that the absence of APAs in Kenya could be attributable to among others, the 
criticisms that have been leveled against APAs, some of which were highlighted at Chapter 3 
above. However, in the Author’s opinion, the advantages offered APAs outweigh the 
disadvantages. While it is true that the adoption of the programme may not in itself make 
difficult TP issues go away,
316
 it is equally true that non-adoption of the programme does not 
solve the problems either. The APA programme, if successfully implemented has the potential of 
offering more confidence to foreign investors by offering the necessary certainty on the tax 
treatment of their transactions, hence serve to attract the much needed foreign direct investment 
into the country. The adoption of the programme would also enhance certainty to the Kenyan 
government by ensuring that the correct amount taxes from the Kenyan based members of 
multinational enterprises are collected when such taxes are due.  
 
With available statistics indicating that the use of APAs has currently expanded to over 50 
countries, some of which are Kenya’s major trading partners,317 the APA programme in Kenya 
will not only serve to boost international trade, but will also help to align Kenya’s internal tax 
system with current global trend in international taxation. The experiences from countries such 
as China, India and the US on APAs can serve as a vital reference point for Kenya in the 
implementation of the programme. However, care must always be taken to ensure that such 
experiences are adapted to reflect Kenya’s unique economic and legal circumstances. One such 
experience would for example, for the country to initially focus more on unilateral APAs as it 
develops the necessary experience and confidence to be able to engage on the more technical 
bilateral and multilateral APAs.      
 
In the implementation of the programme, it must however be remembered that the APA 
programme must harmoniously coexist with the rest of the country’s tax, legal and constitutional 
provisions. In the context of Kenya for example, constitutional provisions such as the right for 
fair administrative action, equity and equality issues, among others, must be respected.  
 
In the premises, it is recommended that the Kenyan government should consider introducing the 
APA programme to help in resolving its TP issues. This could be done for example by amending 
the Income Tax Act by inserting a rule 8A under the TP Rules, 2006 to empower the 
Commissioner of income taxes with the power to negotiate and conclude APAs. 
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